Countering the diffusion of responsibility in petty collusive bribery: Experimental evidence on accountability reminders

Petty collusive bribery is hard to curb because both the briber and the bribed official benefit from the transaction, while the harm falls on a third party. In a laboratory experiment, we show that a simple accountability reminder-stating that both actors are equally responsible for the corrupt exchange and its consequences---substantially reduces collusive bribery, lowering the frequency of both bribe offers and bribe acceptances. Giving the harmed third party the opportunity to express approval or disapproval of the actors' decisions, however, does not yield a further statistically significant reduction in corruption when combined with the accountability reminder. The results suggest that a low-cost intervention designed to counteract the diffusion of responsibility inherent in jointly produced corrupt outcomes can discourage corrupt behavior on both sides of the exchange and that combining behavioral interventions need not amplify their effects.