Sopravvenienza morale e naturalismo. Un'analisi critica

This essay first analyses the role of moral supervenience within moral non-cognitivism and naturalist moral realism, as well. Its aim is to show that neither supervenience as understood in non-cognitivism nor supervenience as conceived of in naturalist moral realism succeed in satisfying naturalists’ expectations; that is, supervenience is not able either to show the superiority of non-cognitivism over realism or to conciliate the ethical dimension with a moderate kind of naturalism which is ready to acknowledge the specific nature of ethics. A third, non-naturalist notion of supervenience is then being put forward and developed along with the discussion of Schafer-Landau’s proposal of moral realism. Such an alternative notion figures out supervenience as a relation which is characterized by a metaphysical form of necessity/possibility.