Tacit collusion and match-fixing are recurring phenonmena of sport contests. This paper presents a simple formal model in order to exaplin them. The intuition behind is that an asymmetry in the evaluation of the stake is the key factor leadng to match-fixing or to tacit collusion. In particular, it will be demonstrated that an asymmetry in the evaluation of the stake can lead to a concession from one agent to the other and then to match-fixing. It is also demonstrated that when the asymmetry in the evaluation is extremely large there is room for tacit collusion. Eventually, the intuitin and the resulsts of the model will be applied to make a comparison between the FIFA World Cup and the UEFA Champions league Tournaments.
Caruso, R., The Economics of Match-Fixing, in Frang, E., Dietl, H., Kempf, H. (ed.), Fussball: Ökonomie einer Leidenschaft, Hofmann-Verlag, Magglinglen 2009: 323- 341 [http://hdl.handle.net/10807/31372]
The Economics of Match-Fixing
Caruso, Raul
2009
Abstract
Tacit collusion and match-fixing are recurring phenonmena of sport contests. This paper presents a simple formal model in order to exaplin them. The intuition behind is that an asymmetry in the evaluation of the stake is the key factor leadng to match-fixing or to tacit collusion. In particular, it will be demonstrated that an asymmetry in the evaluation of the stake can lead to a concession from one agent to the other and then to match-fixing. It is also demonstrated that when the asymmetry in the evaluation is extremely large there is room for tacit collusion. Eventually, the intuitin and the resulsts of the model will be applied to make a comparison between the FIFA World Cup and the UEFA Champions league Tournaments.
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