The book aims at showing how the application of the principles of “fair trial” in the matter of administrative law urges a material overhauling on the function of administrative trial. Indeed, wider and more incisive powers shall be assigned to administrative judges for challenging Public Administration decisions, therefore granting citizens with new defenses vis-à-vis public powers. The book, as first thing, mentions that the authors of Art. 6 of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) decided to leave out from the rule on “fair trial” – i.e. on the right to a trial of reasonable length, before an independent and impartial judge and with effective possibilities of defense – the administrative matter, due to its alleged specialty in comparison with civil and criminal law. Over the time, however, the European Court of Human Rights “re-defined” the concepts contained in Art. 6 ECHR. Therefore, the notion of “criminal charge” was extended to certain administrative penalties. Similarly, the concept of “tribunal” was deemed as referable also to any authority endowed with the power to issue binding decisions, capable of affecting the subjective situation of any person. In this way, the Court extended the applicability of the fair trial principles to administrative trial – i.e. the jurisdictional remedies vis-à-vis Public Administration – as well as to administrative procedure, handled by the Public Administration itself. Consequently, the guarantees of fair trial shall be afforded also in administrative procedures, first of all as regards impartiality and independence of the body endowed with decisional powers: these features, however, often lack in Public Administration. The Court, nonetheless, with a flexible approach, admitted that, in principle, such kind of shortcomings in administrative procedure could be “compensated” by the impartiality and independence of the tribunal before which the administrative decisions can then be challenged. In order for such “compensation” mechanism to work, it is indeed necessary that the relevant tribunal has an effective power to fully re-examine the administrative decision, being also entitled to take discretionary decisions. The book, therefore, underlines how such findings have material consequences in Italian administrative law, according to which, instead, the judge is usually prevented from controlling the outcome of technical discretion exercise by the Public Administration. In spite of the traditional national approach, the findings of the European Court of Human Rights are binding for Italian judges. Indeed, not only Italy is a contracting State to ECHR, but principles laid down in Art. 6 ECHR, on one side, are taken up in the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union and, on the other side, have been agreed with and applied by the European Court of Justice. The foregoing, besides, in a European context that more and more frequently acknowledges the essentiality of the availability of effective judicial remedies. In this way, Art. 6 ECHR would be able to trigger a change in the relationship between citizens and Public Administration, granting greater chances to obtain justice vis-à-vis the Public Administration.
Il volume mette in luce come l’applicazione dei princìpi dell'“equo processo” di cui all'art. 6 CEDU, nell’ambito del diritto amministrativo renda necessario un radicale ripensamento della funzione del processo amministrativo. Al giudice amministrativo, infatti, andranno riconosciuti poteri di revisione delle decisioni della pubblica amministrazione ben più ampi e pervasivi che in passato, così fornendo al cittadino nuovi strumenti di tutela contro i pubblici poteri. Il libro, anzitutto, ricorda che i redattori dell’art. 6 della Convenzione Europea dei Diritti dell’Uomo #CEDU# decisero di escludere dalla norma sull' “equoo processo” – ossia sul diritto ad un processo che si svolga in tempi ragionevoli, davanti a un giudice terzo ed imparziale e con effettive possibilità di difesa – la materia amministrativa, per via della sua ritenuta specialità rispetto al diritto civile e penale. Nel tempo, tuttavia, è stata la Corte Europea dei Diritti dell’Uomo a “ridefinire” i concetti contenuti nell’art. 6 CEDU. Così, la nozione di “accusa penale” è stata estesa sino a ricomprendere anche certe sanzioni amministrative. Allo stesso modo, la nozione di “tribunale” è stata ritenuta riferibile a qualunque autorità cui sia attribuito il potere di emanare provvedimenti vincolanti, idonei ad incidere sulla sfera soggettiva di un privato. In tal modo, la Corte è giunta ad estendere l’area di operatività dei principi sull'equo processo tanto al processo amministrativo – ossia al momento giurisdizionale di tutela dei diritti nei confronti delle pubbliche amministrazioni – quanto al procedimento amministrativo, che si svolge invece proprio davanti alle pubbliche pmministrazioni. Di conseguenza, anche nel procedimento amministrativo dovranno essere rispettate le garanzie proprie dell’“equo processo”, in primis, quelle di imparzialità e di indipendenza in capo all’organo munito di poteri decisori: caratteristiche che spesso, però, non sono proprie della pubblica amministrazione. La Corte, tuttavia, adottando un approccio flessibile, ha riconosciuto che carenze di tal genere nel procedimento amministrativo possono, in linea di massima, essere “compensate” dall’imparzialità e indipendenza del giudice davanti al quale sia possibile fare ricorso contro la decisione amministrativa. Perché tale meccanismo di “compensazione” possa operare, occorre però che questo giudice abbia un effettivo potere di riesaminare integralmente la decisione amministrativa, arrivando anche a compiere scelte propriamente discrezionali. Il libro, quindi, evidenzia come una tale conclusione abbia effetti rilevantissimi nella prospettiva del diritto amministrativo italiano, in cui al giudice, invece, è normalmente precluso il sindacato sulla discrezionalità tecnica esercitata dalla Pubblica Amministrazione. A dispetto del tradizionale approccio nazionale, le conclusioni elaborate dalla Corte Europea dei Diritti dell’Uomo sono vincolanti per i giudici italiani. Non solo, infatti, l’Italia aderisce alla CEDU, ma i medesimi principi dell’art. 6 CEDU sono, da un lato, riprodotti nella Carta dei Diritti Fondamentali dell’Unione Europea e, dall’altro, sono stati accolti ed applicati dalla Corte di Giustizia dell’Unione Europea. Ciò, oltretutto, in un contesto europeo che riconosce sempre più frequentemente l’essenzialità della garanzia di rimedi giurisdizionali effettivi. Per questa via, quindi, secondo Allena, l’art. 6 CEDU sarebbe in grado di provocare una trasformazione dei rapporti tra cittadini e potere amministrativo, garantendo maggiori possibilità di ottenere giustizia nei confronti della Pubblica Amministrazione.
Allena, M., Art. 6 CEDU. Procedimento e processo amministrativo, Editoriale scientifica, Napoli 2012:<<PERCORSI DI DIRITTO AMMINISTRATIVO>>, 337 [http://hdl.handle.net/10807/28639]
Art. 6 CEDU. Procedimento e processo amministrativo
Allena, Miriam
2012
Abstract
The book aims at showing how the application of the principles of “fair trial” in the matter of administrative law urges a material overhauling on the function of administrative trial. Indeed, wider and more incisive powers shall be assigned to administrative judges for challenging Public Administration decisions, therefore granting citizens with new defenses vis-à-vis public powers. The book, as first thing, mentions that the authors of Art. 6 of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) decided to leave out from the rule on “fair trial” – i.e. on the right to a trial of reasonable length, before an independent and impartial judge and with effective possibilities of defense – the administrative matter, due to its alleged specialty in comparison with civil and criminal law. Over the time, however, the European Court of Human Rights “re-defined” the concepts contained in Art. 6 ECHR. Therefore, the notion of “criminal charge” was extended to certain administrative penalties. Similarly, the concept of “tribunal” was deemed as referable also to any authority endowed with the power to issue binding decisions, capable of affecting the subjective situation of any person. In this way, the Court extended the applicability of the fair trial principles to administrative trial – i.e. the jurisdictional remedies vis-à-vis Public Administration – as well as to administrative procedure, handled by the Public Administration itself. Consequently, the guarantees of fair trial shall be afforded also in administrative procedures, first of all as regards impartiality and independence of the body endowed with decisional powers: these features, however, often lack in Public Administration. The Court, nonetheless, with a flexible approach, admitted that, in principle, such kind of shortcomings in administrative procedure could be “compensated” by the impartiality and independence of the tribunal before which the administrative decisions can then be challenged. In order for such “compensation” mechanism to work, it is indeed necessary that the relevant tribunal has an effective power to fully re-examine the administrative decision, being also entitled to take discretionary decisions. The book, therefore, underlines how such findings have material consequences in Italian administrative law, according to which, instead, the judge is usually prevented from controlling the outcome of technical discretion exercise by the Public Administration. In spite of the traditional national approach, the findings of the European Court of Human Rights are binding for Italian judges. Indeed, not only Italy is a contracting State to ECHR, but principles laid down in Art. 6 ECHR, on one side, are taken up in the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union and, on the other side, have been agreed with and applied by the European Court of Justice. The foregoing, besides, in a European context that more and more frequently acknowledges the essentiality of the availability of effective judicial remedies. In this way, Art. 6 ECHR would be able to trigger a change in the relationship between citizens and Public Administration, granting greater chances to obtain justice vis-à-vis the Public Administration.I documenti in IRIS sono protetti da copyright e tutti i diritti sono riservati, salvo diversa indicazione.