The contribution elaborates a theoretical model of two-party competition. The main result concerns condition under which competition leads in equlibrium to divergence of the party's electoral programs.
Grillo, M., Polo, M., Political exchange and the allocation of surplus: a model of two-party competition, in Breton, A., Galeotti, G., Salmon, P., Wintrobe, R. (ed.), Preferences and Democracy, Kluwer, Dordrecht 1993: 215- 244 [http://hdl.handle.net/10807/26238]
Political exchange and the allocation of surplus: a model of two-party competition
Grillo, Michele;Polo, Michele
1993
Abstract
The contribution elaborates a theoretical model of two-party competition. The main result concerns condition under which competition leads in equlibrium to divergence of the party's electoral programs.
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