In this paper we ask whether and how there can be room for the notion of dominance to be sensibly applied to mergers in non-collusive oligopolies. We come to the somewhat unexpected conclusion that, even in oligopoly, the European test of 'dominance' is much closer to the US test of 'substantial lessening of competition' than is usually thought to be.
Grillo, M., Magnani, L., Antitrust Appraisal of Mergers in Oligopolistic Markets, in Raffaelli, E. (ed.), Antitrust Between EC Law and National Law, Bruylant, Bruxelles 2005: 291- 301 [http://hdl.handle.net/10807/26083]
Antitrust Appraisal of Mergers in Oligopolistic Markets
Grillo, Michele;
2005
Abstract
In this paper we ask whether and how there can be room for the notion of dominance to be sensibly applied to mergers in non-collusive oligopolies. We come to the somewhat unexpected conclusion that, even in oligopoly, the European test of 'dominance' is much closer to the US test of 'substantial lessening of competition' than is usually thought to be.
File in questo prodotto:
Non ci sono file associati a questo prodotto.
I documenti in IRIS sono protetti da copyright e tutti i diritti sono riservati, salvo diversa indicazione.
