Extending some results of the economic theory of incomplete contracts to the analysis of political exchange, the contribution argues that the constitutional principle of isonomia - that is, the separation of legislature and government, which leads to democratically elected governments being subject to 'equal laws' - is a necessary condition for the optimal working of representative democracy.

Grillo, M., Democracy, competition, and the principle of Isonomia: An economic analysis of the political exchange as an incomplete contract, in Breton, A., Galeotti, G., Salmon, P., Wintrobe, R. (ed.), Understanding Democracy, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 1997: 47- 63 [http://hdl.handle.net/10807/26057]

Democracy, competition, and the principle of Isonomia: An economic analysis of the political exchange as an incomplete contract

Grillo, Michele
1997

Abstract

Extending some results of the economic theory of incomplete contracts to the analysis of political exchange, the contribution argues that the constitutional principle of isonomia - that is, the separation of legislature and government, which leads to democratically elected governments being subject to 'equal laws' - is a necessary condition for the optimal working of representative democracy.
1997
Inglese
Understanding Democracy
0521582369
Grillo, M., Democracy, competition, and the principle of Isonomia: An economic analysis of the political exchange as an incomplete contract, in Breton, A., Galeotti, G., Salmon, P., Wintrobe, R. (ed.), Understanding Democracy, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 1997: 47- 63 [http://hdl.handle.net/10807/26057]
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Utilizza questo identificativo per citare o creare un link a questo documento: https://hdl.handle.net/10807/26057
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