The contribution analyses alternative game-theoretical approaches to detect tacit collusion in oligopolistic markets

Grillo, M., A Game-Theoretical Perspective for the Detection of Tacit Collusion, in Patrone, F., Garcia-jurado, I., Tijs, S. (ed.), Game Practice: Contribution from Applied Game Theory, Kluwer, Amsterdam 2000: 109- 122 [http://hdl.handle.net/10807/26054]

A Game-Theoretical Perspective for the Detection of Tacit Collusion

Grillo
2000

Abstract

The contribution analyses alternative game-theoretical approaches to detect tacit collusion in oligopolistic markets
Inglese
Game Practice: Contribution from Applied Game Theory
0792386612
Grillo, M., A Game-Theoretical Perspective for the Detection of Tacit Collusion, in Patrone, F., Garcia-jurado, I., Tijs, S. (ed.), Game Practice: Contribution from Applied Game Theory, Kluwer, Amsterdam 2000: 109- 122 [http://hdl.handle.net/10807/26054]
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Utilizza questo identificativo per citare o creare un link a questo documento: https://hdl.handle.net/10807/26054
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