The contribution analyses alternative game-theoretical approaches to detect tacit collusion in oligopolistic markets
Grillo, M., A Game-Theoretical Perspective for the Detection of Tacit Collusion, in Patrone, F., Garcia-Jurado, I., Tijs, S. (ed.), Game Practice: Contribution from Applied Game Theory, Kluwer, Amsterdam 2000: 109- 122 [http://hdl.handle.net/10807/26054]
A Game-Theoretical Perspective for the Detection of Tacit Collusion
Grillo, Michele
2000
Abstract
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