The concept of a repeated game is introduced and applied to the case of the centipede, the finite and the indefinitely repeated prisoner’s dilemma. The consequences of the assumption of common knowledge of rationality are outlined. A concept of reasonableness is introduced and some of its effects are discussed.
Beretta, C. L., Appunti su giochi ed istituzioni: I giochi ripetuti, <<QUADERNI DEL DIPARTIMENTO DI ECONOMIA INTERNAZIONALE DELLE ISTITUZIONI E DELLO SVILUPPO>>, 2011; 2011 (1105): 3-52 [http://hdl.handle.net/10807/12183]
Appunti su giochi ed istituzioni: I giochi ripetuti
Beretta, Carlo Luigi
2011
Abstract
The concept of a repeated game is introduced and applied to the case of the centipede, the finite and the indefinitely repeated prisoner’s dilemma. The consequences of the assumption of common knowledge of rationality are outlined. A concept of reasonableness is introduced and some of its effects are discussed.
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