We study an example of strategic delegation in Cournot duopoly and show that if contracts are both observable and renegotiable before becoming common knowledge at the outset of the delegated game, the strategic value of contracts is preserved, but the set of equilibria is greatly enlarged. Managerial contracts can be used by owners to co-ordinate on any product market equilibrium allowing them to get a level of profit at least as large as the profit obtainable in the strategic delegation equilibrium without renegotiation, which is used as a threat point. The equilibrium set includes joint profit maximisation.

Merzoni, G. S., Observable and Renegotiable Contracts as Commitments to Cooperate, <<Quaderno DISEIS n. 0801>>, 2008; (Febbraio): 3-30 [http://hdl.handle.net/10807/11490]

Observable and Renegotiable Contracts as Commitments to Cooperate

Merzoni, Guido Stefano
2008

Abstract

We study an example of strategic delegation in Cournot duopoly and show that if contracts are both observable and renegotiable before becoming common knowledge at the outset of the delegated game, the strategic value of contracts is preserved, but the set of equilibria is greatly enlarged. Managerial contracts can be used by owners to co-ordinate on any product market equilibrium allowing them to get a level of profit at least as large as the profit obtainable in the strategic delegation equilibrium without renegotiation, which is used as a threat point. The equilibrium set includes joint profit maximisation.
Inglese
Merzoni, G. S., Observable and Renegotiable Contracts as Commitments to Cooperate, <<Quaderno DISEIS n. 0801>>, 2008; (Febbraio): 3-30 [http://hdl.handle.net/10807/11490]
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Utilizza questo identificativo per citare o creare un link a questo documento: https://hdl.handle.net/10807/11490
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