In April 1982, Argentina – a country allied with the United States through the Rio Pact – suddenly invaded the Falkland Islands, a long-time Overseas Territory of the United Kingdom, disputed by Buenos Aires since the XIXth century. Margaret Thatcher, the then British Prime Minister, vigorously responded and finally Britain – a US NATO ally – was able to regain the Islands and re-establish the status quo ante. The conflict needs to be contextualized in the ‘second Cold War’ framework. The struggle between the United States and the Soviet Union was particularly tough in the first years of the 1980s and the bipolar logic strongly influenced the diplomatic course of the 1982 war. On the one hand, the Western hemisphere was at the core of the renewed anti-communist US strategy and Argentina was the main pillar in the Southern Cone. On the other hand, the strengthening of the Anglo-American ‘special relationship’ was the European cornerstone of the US grand strategy. Against this background, what kind of role the US chose to play in the Falklands war between two of their allies instinctively arises as the main question. Affected by diverging interests, the ‘special relationship’ was not indeed entirely special.
Nell’aprile 1982, l’Argentina – un Paese alleato degli Stati Uniti attraverso il Patto di Rio – invase le isole Falkland, un Territorio d’Oltremare del Regno Unito, rivendicato da Buenos Aires sin dal XIX secolo. Margaret Thatcher, l’allora Primo Ministro britannico, rispose con vigore. Alla fine la Gran Bretagna – alleato NATO degli USA – riuscì a riconquistare le isole e a ristabilire lo status quo ante. Il conflitto va inquadrato nel framework della ‘seconda Guerra Fredda’. Il confronto tra gli Stati Uniti e l’Unione Sovietica fu particolarmente aspro nei primi anni Ottanta e la logica bipolare influenzò le dinamiche diplomatiche della guerra del 1982. Da un lato, l’Emisfero occidentale era al centro della rinnovata strategia americana anti-comunista e l’Argentina era il principale pilastro nel Cono Sud. Dall’altro lato, il rafforzamento della ‘speciale relazione’ anglo-americana costituiva la pietra angolare della grand strategy statunitense nel teatro europeo. Con questo sfondo, è naturale domandarsi quale ruolo Washington scelse di giocare nella guerra delle Falkland tra due dei suoi alleati. A causa di interessi divergenti, la ‘relazione speciale’ non fu infatti del tutto speciale.
BORSANI, DAVIDE, LA "RELAZIONE SPECIALE" ANGLO-AMERICANA E LA GUERRA DELLA FALKLAND (1982), DE LEONARDIS, MASSIMO, Università Cattolica del Sacro Cuore Milano:Ciclo XXVII [https://hdl.handle.net/10807/285100]
LA "RELAZIONE SPECIALE" ANGLO-AMERICANA E LA GUERRA DELLA FALKLAND (1982)
Borsani, Davide
2015
Abstract
In April 1982, Argentina – a country allied with the United States through the Rio Pact – suddenly invaded the Falkland Islands, a long-time Overseas Territory of the United Kingdom, disputed by Buenos Aires since the XIXth century. Margaret Thatcher, the then British Prime Minister, vigorously responded and finally Britain – a US NATO ally – was able to regain the Islands and re-establish the status quo ante. The conflict needs to be contextualized in the ‘second Cold War’ framework. The struggle between the United States and the Soviet Union was particularly tough in the first years of the 1980s and the bipolar logic strongly influenced the diplomatic course of the 1982 war. On the one hand, the Western hemisphere was at the core of the renewed anti-communist US strategy and Argentina was the main pillar in the Southern Cone. On the other hand, the strengthening of the Anglo-American ‘special relationship’ was the European cornerstone of the US grand strategy. Against this background, what kind of role the US chose to play in the Falklands war between two of their allies instinctively arises as the main question. Affected by diverging interests, the ‘special relationship’ was not indeed entirely special.File | Dimensione | Formato | |
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