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The volume, edited by two Genevan scholars, collects eleven essays, five of which are devoted to both Anton Marty (1847–1914) and Karl Bühler (1879–1963). Of the remaining essays, two deal with Marty and four with Bühler, who are mostly considered with regard to other scholars such as Franz Brentano (1838–1917), Carl Stumpf (1848–1936), Philipp Wegener (1848–1916) and Alan H. Gardiner (1879–1963).

The volume is divided into four parts: I. Phenomenological, pragmatic and semiotic approaches to language; II. Contributions to descriptive psychology; III. Semantic and ontological issues; IV: Empirical approaches to language. The introduction by the two editors contains a lot of first-hand information and is followed by seven pages with the English abstracts of all the essays. Two essays are in German, six in French and three in English. The book concludes with a useful index of names.

Ten essays originated as talks or round-table speeches at the Colloque international Anton Marty et Karl Bühler philosophes du langage: Origines, relations et postérité de leur pensée, which took place in Geneva in 2010. The conference was organised by the same indefatigable editors of the book, together with Kevin Mulligan. Mulligan had paved the way to a collaborative, multi-person research project on Marty many years earlier in 1984, beginning with a colloquium in Fribourg. He is also the editor of an important volume on Marty (Mulligan ed., 1990). However, even in 2010 the conference announcement read: “In spite of their remarkable impact on contemporary language theories, Marty’s and Bühler’s works remain widely unknown, especially in the francophone environment”. As will be shown below, these collective enterprises characterise the third phase of Marty’s reception and bring into a new light two rich and well-grounded theories on language which for various reasons have remained unexplored or largely neglected for many decades.

As Cesalli and Friedrich competently summarise in their introduction, the reception of Marty and Bühler went through different phases, at least in our Western
countries. During his lifetime, publications by Marty were reviewed by Edmund Husserl (1859–1938) (Husserl 1897 [not 1896: p. xii] and 1903) and Bühler (1909), among others. Soon afterwards, his thought is briefly discussed in a dissertation by Martin Heidegger (1889–1976) (Heidegger 1914) and examined at length in a monograph by Otto Funke (1885–1973) (Funke 1924), who later edited his posthumous work as well (Marty 1925–1940), as well as in a dissertation by Ludwig Landgrebe (1902–1991) (Landgrebe 1935). Many decades go by before the publications of two Italian monographs, both by young scholars of the two Milan universities (the Catholic and the State University) where phenomenology had become rooted more than elsewhere in the country (see Raynaud 1982 and Spinicci 1991).

It is at the very beginning of the nineties that a new term begins: six years after the first international conference in Marty’s homeland Switzerland had taken place, the first edited book with fifteen (not thirteen: p. xiii) contributions is published (Mulligan ed., 1990). In English, it opens a wider distribution among philosophers, after the German beginnings and the ensuing Italian period. Note that the volume under review does not examine the Japanese nor the Prague reception of Marty’s and Bühler’s oeuvre, which by the way has been more linguistically than philosophically oriented. Nevertheless, three Japanese authors are mentioned in the introduction, with their names and titles, who were active from the mid-thirties to the seventies in the last century (p. xiii).

In the 21st century, several new titles were published, on the occasion of the first centennial of important chronological milestones: the publication of Marty’s Untersuchungen zur Grundlegung der allgemeinen Grammatik und Sprachphilosophie (1908), of the review of this opus magnum which Bühler published in 1909, and of Marty’s death (1914), cf. the special issue of Brentano Studien on Marty (2009), Rollinger’s (2010) monograph, which includes the English translation of some of Marty’s texts, and the present volume (Cesalli & Friedrich ed., 2014) as an outcome of the 2010 Geneva conference. At the end of this review, I will mention some additional publications and scientific events organised on the occasion of the above-mentioned anniversaries.

Bühler’s reception traversed different paths. As his life was suddenly devastated by his being imprisoned in Vienna by the Gestapo (he then escaped to the USA, where he remained until his death in 1963), so his reputation passed from the peaks of his Vienna years — Bühler was the founder of the Institute of Psychology and a prominent academic personality of his time — to the neglect of the American years which he spent as an alien. An exception to this kind of disappearance was the publication of the Bühler-Studien (1984), edited by Achim Eschbach, which focused on his semiotic foundations, as well as a gradual acknowledgement of his “protopragmatic” leanings (p. xiv). This is quite another story if it is compared with Jean Piaget’s fame.
However, if the strength of thoughts must be intrinsically evaluated rather than inferred from the reverberation thinkers achieve publicly, the real issue at stake is the new trend initiated by Marty and Bühler. According to Cesalli and Friedrich, “semantics is to be considered as a part of psychology of language” by Marty (p. ix). Conversely, to the philosophy of language (p. ix) “belong all those questions from the science of language which are directed upon that which, in the science of language, is general and governed by laws (das Allgemeine und Gesetzmäβige), questions which are of psychological nature or cannot be answered without the essential help of psychology” (Marty 1940: 83). “As for linguistic meaning — Marty’s object of investigation par excellence [which the editors rightfully acknowledge, S.R.] — its analysis is also based on psychology. Meaning is a matter of speaker’s intentions primarily aimed at triggering psychic phenomena in hearers” (p. ix).

Here, two themes deserve to be highlighted: the empirical standpoint ("all those questions from the science of language") and the intersubjective perspective (speaker and hearer). Two truly innovative points of view can then be appreciated, as characterising the original Austro-German context with regard to both German idealism and French positivism, which are rather closer to British empiricism. It can furthermore be observed that the English translations (“intention”, “intentional”) of the German expressions “Absicht”, “absichtlich” help us — while bringing us back to the same Latin roots, which are more obvious in English than in German — to recognise a kind of parallelism between intentionality in knowledge (a wider, inclusive topic for the entire Brentano school) and in verbal communication.

The aforementioned two themes should be key to understanding what is claimed to be “the starting point, but also the challenge” of the volume under review, i.e., “to assess the indissoluble link between psychology and philosophy of language in the thought of Bühler and Marty” (p. xii). As a matter of fact, both Marty and Bühler aim to abstract general insights from a large number of linguistic facts. This approach allows them to outline the psychic life of speakers and its powers in terms of effectiveness with regard to self-disclosure and mutual influence in verbal communication.

I am here suggesting the importance, which should not be underestimated, of two seminal moments in the research careers of the two scholars. On Marty’s side, we have his early, as yet unpublished study *Die Lehre des hl. Thomas über die Abstraktion der übersinnlichen Ideen aus den sinnlichen Bildern* (1867). Marty was twenty and won a prize for this work of more than 150 pages. The study deals with the theory of knowledge (called ‘logic’ in his later works) from the Middle Ages to the Modern Age: Kant, Fichte and Schelling are extensively criticised, and Brentano’s name is already mentioned, before any personal meeting between the
two took place. On Bühler’s side, we have his encounter with Trubetzkoy’s phonological inquiries and the connected theory of abstractive relevance. The pre-critical perspective therefore could not be a naïve one; experience had to be shaped by sciences, and their data investigated — “fixed, interpreted, determined” — according to the triple scale Guillaume Fréchette envisages and discusses in his essay “Fixer, interpreter, determiner: Éléments de psychologie descriptive de Brentano et Marty à Bühler” (pp. 79–101).

It is in this perspective that I understand the well-known, but still largely enigmatic, passage by Bühler, quoted [omitting some words in italics provided below] in the editors’ introduction (pp. x–xi):

Prophet to the right, prophet to the left, and the child of this world in the middle.
The theory of language must be the child of this world, that is, the simple tip of the empirical work of language researchers. If philosophy is the prophet to the right which language theory must repulse whenever it [emphasis added, S.R.] perceives the danger of epistemologism, that is, a declaration extorted from language in favour of one of the fundamental epistemological attitudes, it is only right and proper for it to demand the same respect for its independence from the prophet to the left. Psychology is the prophet to the left. (Bühler 2011: xcii)

German die einfache Spitze is here translated as the simple tip, which is rendered as semplicemente il vertice in the Italian translation (Bühler 1983) and as juste le sommet in the French one (Bühler 2009). Incidentally, the reference in footnote 13 on p. xi of the editors’ introduction has to be corrected. If “TL” is the abbreviation for Theory of Language (Bühler ²2011); however, “TL” is missing from the list of Abbreviations on pp.xxv–xxvi, then the correct page number is p.lvi, not p.65, which is true instead for the French translation of the same passage (Bühler 2009). But is it tip or top? It is certainly not a misprint; the original English translation is tip and the original German word Spitze allows for both interpretations, tip and top. Still, the two translations differ in meaning because tip can also mean an extremity which can be identified as a border or margin and not only just ‘on top’. However, the images of a tip or top may suggest a dominant position, a summit to be reached. If we need textual confirmation of these metaphors, we — including Bühler — live by, let us recall the very incipit of Bühler’s Theory of Language:

On entering the field of language theory, we encounter two unsolved problems […]. The first of these problems is to determine the full contents and character of what can properly be called specifically linguistic observations, and the second to give a systematic account of the highest [italics mine, S.R.] regulative research ideas that guide and animate the inductions characteristic of the sciences of language. (Bühler ²2011: 17)
This passage suggests that, instead of being ‘the simple tip’, the theory of language is called on to be ‘the mere top’ or ‘simply the top’ of the empirical work of language researchers.

What, then, does Bühler suggest when he speaks of ‘epistemologism’, alluding to Goethe and using the surprising expression ‘child of this world’ (das Weltkind) to introduce the theory of language? As is usual among philosophers, and even among linguists who see themselves more frequently as highly specialised technicians rather than as artisans who reveal features of the local cultures (see Moeschler’s “Remarques sur la ‘Théorie du langage’ du point de vue de la pragmatique contemporaine”, pp. 267–292), no specific reference can be found in the book regarding the geography involved in the enquired traditions and schools. However, Bühler writes about prophets and epistemologism in Vienna in 1934, i.e., in the same year when Rudolf Carnap (1891–1970), who was also in Vienna, publishes his Logische Syntax der Sprache. The Vienna Circle is in the spotlight and Bühler opens his Theory of Language with the claim quoted above. Philosophy, then, is in danger of epistemologism, extorting from language claims that favour only one of the fundamental epistemological attitudes — the one, the reader is prone to argue, leading to physicalism and antimetaphysicism. Nevertheless, neither is psychology able to subjugate the theory of language. Bühler is probably thinking of the methodological and epistemological constraints that are typical of physiological psychology, behaviourism and so on, and he surely wants psychology to reorganize its ‘domestic affairs’, as he argued in Die Krise der Psychologie (1927). Language and its theory is therefore the ‘child of this world’, according to Goethe’s Dichtung und Wahrheit, an autobiographical story which describes “the seating arrangement at a dinner in Koblenz when Goethe sat between Lavater and Basedow, both of whom talked to other members of the company about arcane theological points whilst Goethe preferred to enjoy the worldly pleasures of the meal”, as is explained in a footnote by the English translator of the Sprachtheorie (Bühler 2011: xcii, n. 2). The French translator adds a useful clarification: “La formule est devenue proverbiale pour désigner celui qui ne se préoccupe pas des opinions des autres, de ceux notamment qui ne tiennent plus compte des réalités immédiates” (Bühler 2009: 65, n. 1)

If this is the attitude shared by Marty and Bühler — though with a different intensity and inner disciplinary proportions — regarding describing and understanding what has to be inquired, then language is the ideal matter. Description is a necessary prerequisite in order to understand, and yet describing is not sufficient to understand, to grasp psychic life as a whole as well as its inner articulation (Marty’s most desired goal) and to inquire into its relationship with human subjects as well as with objects and states of affairs (Bühler’s further goal). Thus, the editors rightly point out that there is a further challenge, beyond the one
announced, “to assess the indissoluble link between psychology and the philosophy of language in the thought of Bühler and Marty” (p. xii). That challenge is to show and to prove how language, or rather speech, links the psychic life of speakers and hearers to that telos to which those lives tend, viz. truth, free from any kind of fiction, being in its multifarious modes, phenomena of interest in their full extent and variety. The present book makes this aim more than desirable, even urgent. Linguists — generally speaking — do not seem to be ready to face such a challenge, at least they are not accustomed to working in teams with philosophers and psychologists on such an epistemological level and along these historical timeframes. A pleasing exception is found in the essay by Clemens Knobloch which closes the book, “Was die Evolutionisten in puncto Signalevolution von Bühler und Marty lernen könnten” (pp. 293–330).

Yet, to miss linguistic evidence and its scientific categorisation implies a certain vagueness and regression regarding the strategic move both Marty and Bühler made in their respective contexts. This point is raised by Moeschler (p. 291):

la contribution principale de Bühler ne se situait pas au plan de la théorisation du langage, mais au niveau des faits linguistiques. Les grands linguistes se reconnaissent à leur capacité à formuler des problématiques théoriques fondées sur une analyse pertinente de faits linguistiques.

As an example, I refer to an expression from Frank Liedtke’s paper “Ausdrücken und Bedeuten: Anton Martys Sprachphilosophie im Lichte der Kritik Karl Bühlers” (pp. 43–58). Though Liedtke quite conveniently considers Marty as an early proponent of those pragmatic issues which are mostly associated with John L. Austin (1911–1960) and Herbert Paul Grice (1913–1988), he does not seem to properly identify the auto- or synsemantic means of expression (according to Marty’s terminology) on the linguistic level, i.e., as noun phrases, verb phrases, or sentences characterised by different illocutionary forces, speaking instead — at least in the English abstract of his paper — of “language devices” (p. xviii). If ‘device’ usually means a machine or a tool designed for a specific purpose, its meaning strongly conflicts with what is so typical of human speech — not a ready-made tool, but a personal artefact, requiring creativity and context sensitivity.

This is an issue to which both Marty and Bühler pay particular attention. Some of the authors in the present volume have caught this in-between area, apt to favour the meeting of thoughts, feelings and determination on one side with linguistic (outer and inner) forms on the other, a meeting which always requires proper interpretation and understanding by the addressees, as several essays convincingly illustrate: Claudio Majolino’s “Par-delà la suppléance. Contributions à une sémiotique phénoménologique: Bühler et Marty” (pp. 3–41), Laurent Cesalli’s “Marty, Bühler, and Landgrebe on Linguistic Functions” (pp. 59–75),
Janette Friedrich’s “Disposition d'attention, schèmes et sphère de signification. Comment Bühler défend-il une psychologie de la pensée?” (pp. 141–163), Robin D. Rollinger’s “Brentano and Marty on Logical Names and Linguistic Fictions: A parting of ways in the philosophy of language” (pp. 167–200). On the delicate intertwining of sense phenomena and psychic functions, the reader can find instructive comments in Denis Fisette’s paper “Phénomènes sensibles et fonctions psychiques: Karl Bühler et le programme de Stumpf” (pp. 103–140) and Didier Samain’s paper “Wegener, Gardiner, Bühler. Une problématique ou deux modes d'empiricité?” (pp. 237–266).

These papers contribute, on the one hand, to contextualising Marty within the Brentano school, with a special emphasis on Carl Stumpf (1848–1936), and on the other to contextualising Bühler within the early pragmatic movement. In both cases, the emphasis is on the role of experimental work (resp. in Stumpf towards ‘Gestalt’ and in Bühler) as integrating, if not superseding, a mere phenomenological, descriptive perspective.

Marty’s two theories of ‘truth-making’ are compared with the two theories outlined by Brentano, in both published and unpublished work, by Arkadiusz Chrudzimski in his essay “Marty on Truth-Making” (pp. 201–234). As far as the critical edition of Brentano’s works is concerned, Rollinger states: “There is still too much not published or poorly edited from Brentano’s manuscripts to reach a final verdict” (p. 169). In point of fact, the editors of the volume limit themselves to entitle the three contributions of the first part as phenomenological, pragmatic and semiotic ‘approaches, Annäherungen, approches’ to language, and the three final contributions of the fourth part as empirical ‘approaches, Dimensionen, dimensions’.

The fact that the volume veers towards empirical matters at its conclusion is perhaps a clue to the further step that may now be necessary. Leaving the reconstruction of the debate among the philosophical milieu, or other cultivated milieux (as a kind of a second order logic), a little more in the background, and focusing directly on models, theoretical settings and epistemological frameworks, would it not be timely to follow both Marty’s and Bühler’s example and collect linguistic phenomena (objects instead of concepts), observe them, describe them and interpret the way they function in order to allow the addressees to grasp the speakers’ intentions? This approach guided both Marty and Bühler to substantially appreciate the Humboldtian notion of ‘inner language form’. Otto Funke (1885–1973) evidently considered it a sort of a marker of the whole philosophical-linguistic thought developed by Marty (as mentioned above). Quite surprisingly, nobody seems to have paid any significant attention to it in the present volume (except for Majolino, see p. 41). A closer inspection of a neighbouring topic, that of metaphor, is provided by Serena Cattaruzza (2009) in
a special issue of the French journal *Verbum* entirely devoted to *Karl Bühler: Une pensée du langage*. This journal issue partly originated from the same Geneva conference (2010).

Readers who are interested in deepening the study of both Marty and Bühler will be pleased at the announcement of two further publications, each of which treats the two authors separately. After two conferences on Marty 100 years after his death in Prague (1914), which took place in 2014 (the first in Prague and the second in Einsiedeln, Switzerland), a volume entitled *Mind and Language* that gathers many of the talks given on these occasions is currently in preparation. Its editors will be Guillaume Fréchette and Hamid Taieb. 2014 also marks the 80th anniversary of the publication of Bühler’s *Sprachtheorie* (1934). The seventh volume of the *Travaux du Cercle Linguistique de Prague* will soon make accessible the invited speeches, given on the occasion of the conference held in Prague in 2014 and hosted by the Prague Linguistic Circle, to a wider public.

**REFERENCES**


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