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Between Tyranny and Democracy: Political Exiles and the History of Heraclea Pontica

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ABSTRACT: In the surviving fragments of his treatise *On Heraclea* the historian Memnon assigns a central role to the exiles from Heraclea. As opponents of tyranny, they represented a destabilising element, a constant danger to the survival of the Clearchid regime. This article explores the events that led to the banishment of the exiles, reconstructs the politics of expulsion implemented by the tyrants, and clarifies the status of the exiles and their political orientation in the light of Memnon's frequent juxtaposition of the exiles' demand to return to their homeland and the restoration of democracy.

KEYWORDS: Alexander the Great; Clearchids; Clearchus of Heraclea; Democracy; Exiles; Heraclea Pontica; *Letters of Chion*; Memnon of Heraclea; Sinope; Tyranny – Alessandro Magno; Clearchidi; Clearco di Eraclea; Democrazia; Eraclea Pontica; Esili; *Lettere di Chione*; Memnone di Eraclea; Sinope; Tirannide.

The history of Heraclea Pontica, a flourishing city in the Black Sea region, is known mainly from what remains of the work *On Heraclea* written by a local historian, Mnemon (*FGrHist/BNJ* 434)¹. In his surviving fragments – a lengthy summary of Memnon's 9-16 Books or *logoi* is contained in *Codex 224* of Photius' *Bibliotheca* – the history of the city, at least as far as the Classical and Early Hellenistic periods are concerned, is marked by the description of the dynastic tyranny of the Clearchids, who ruled over Heraclea from 364 to 281². This was a singularly long-lasting regime, which survived the turbulence of the 4th century, maintaining a balance

¹ Memnon's work has recently attracted increasing attention from scholars. See, among others, Dueck 2006; Yarrow 2006, 85-93, for the perspective of a non-Roman author who speaks of Rome, and 355-357 for the issue of dating; Tober 2013, 346, 387-414; Gallotta 2014; Paganoni 2015. See also the commentaries on Memnon's fragments by Heinemann 2010 and Davaze 2013, a dissertation as yet unpublished.

² For the history of Heraclea's tyranny see Burstein 1976, 47-89; Saprykin 1997, 3-18; Bittner 1998. All dates must be understood to be BC unless otherwise specified.

between its aspiration for autonomy and the cumbersome presence of Persia³. In telling this story, however, Memnon assigns a central role to the political exiles from Heraclea, who repeatedly emerge as a potentially destabilising factor, a real threat to the survival of the regime⁴. Despite this, scholars, with very few exceptions⁵, have not so far failed to treat the topic comprehensively but have limited themselves to tracing the history of Heraclea as a chronicle, to which they integrate information about the exiles⁶. Thus, while some interesting aspects have been satisfactorily grasped, other equally important features were mostly overlooked. While efforts have been made to understand how the tyrants dealt with the exiles from time to time, especially during the rule of Dionysius, less has been done to ascertain the identity and status of the exiled individuals, the events that led to their expulsion and return, the tyrants' exploitation of the politics of expulsion, and the exiles' quest to enlist the help of foreign potentates in negotiating their return. In this article I shall explore these questions and focus on what seems to be an aporia: how is it possible to reconcile the image of Heraclea's exiles as essentially oligarchic with the fact that their hope to return home always appears to be linked to a project of restoring the ancestral democracy to their homeland?

1. POLITICS OF EXPULSIONS IN HERACLEA

Evidence about the politics of expulsions in Heraclea is scanty⁷. However, what happened to Clearchus, who took power after returning from

³ For the historical aspects of this relationship see Burstein 1976, 41-42, 54-56, 72-74.

⁴ It has been suggested that this key to Memnon derives from its main source, Nymphis of Heraclea. Cf. *FGrHist* III b, *Commento*, 259-260, 269-270; Desideri 1967; Desideri 1991, 16-21; Davaze 2013, 58-65; Gallotta 2009; Gallotta 2014, 68-69; Billows 2010.

⁵ Bittner 1998, 69-78; Heinemann 2010, 44-48 but limited to the first expulsions and the danger the exiles posed to Dionysius.

⁶ Among recent works dealing, among other issues, with Heraclea Pontica several references are made to its exiles, but with no systematic treatment. Thus, Jefremov 2006 and Gallotta 2017 deal with *I.Sinope* 1, which includes a clause on the treatment of exiles by Sinope and Heraclea, focusing on its historical context; Wallace 2018 considers the issue of exiles in relation to Alexander's role as supporter of democracies in Asia Minor; Paganoni 2019a is an in-depth account of the interaction between Alexander and his successors and the cities in the Propontic peninsula; Lester-Pearson 2021 analyses the reasons for the survival of Clearchids' tyranny.

⁷ I am not referring here to the expulsions resulting from the political struggles in which Heraclea was involved shortly after its foundation. Arist. *Pol.* V 5, 1304b 31-34

exile⁸, may suggest that the *stasis* that broke out in Heraclea in the 360s produced in several exiles⁹. Probably the recent institutional reform¹⁰, which increased the number of the tribes and *hekatostues*¹¹, in order to bring about the political fragmentation of the rich by scattering them among the new centurias, failed to achieve the desired long-term effects¹². The people demanded the cancellation of debts and the redistribution of land, but the Council of Three hundred, which at that time effectively ruled the city, was unwilling to give in to their demands. They therefore turned first to the Athenian general Timotheus and subsequently to the Theban Epaminondas for help but in both cases were rejected¹³. Consequently, they saw no other solution than to turn to Clearchus, whom they had sent into exile some time before. But Clearchus, whom exile had made more ruthless, saw this call as a chance to establish a tyranny. He formed an alliance with Mithridates, stipulating that after his readmission he would hand over the city to Mithridates if the latter allowed him to establish personal power in Heraclea. In doing so, Clearchus demonstrated his knowledge of Mithridates' plans of seizing Heraclea. However, he subsequently betrayed Mithridates inflicting on him the treatment he had initially reserved for his fellow citizens. Instead of handing the city over to Mithridates, on his return from exile as the arbi-

mentions exiles (οἱ ἐκπίπτοντες) among the notables who overthrew the democracy. While the main line of Aristotle's account is usually accepted on face value (e.g. Burstein 1976, 19; Robinson 1997, 111-112 and 2011, 157), Avram 2008, 219-221 has questioned the reliability of his reconstruction – essentially a conflict between the *demos* and the *gnorimoi* in a Heraclea that was a democracy from the moment of its foundation – claiming that the *stasis* erupted because of dissatisfaction with the way in which the original land distribution was carried out.

⁸ The way in which Clearchus took power in Heraclea is known from Just. *Epit.* XVI 4, 1-10; *Suda*, s.v. Κλέαρχος. On these events see Burstein 1976, 47-54; Saprykin 1997, 131-134.

⁹ Modern accounts of this *stasis* are those of Burstein 1976, 48-50 and Gehrke 1985, 72.

¹⁰ Thus Bettalli 1990, 249-250; Whitehead 1990, 132 (with the observations at p. 128); Debord 1999, 300. Burstein 1976, 20, goes further in saying that the reform was instituted about 370. Other scholars seem to connect this reform with the framework evoked by Arist. *Pol.* V 5, 1304b 31-34, in a high phase of the city's history, but also after the foundation of the colony (De Luna - Zizza 2016, 346-347).

¹¹ On the nature of the 'hundreds' see Burstein 1976, 21-22; Ferraioli 2012, 35-44. On the 'empreinte mégarienne' of this institution see Avram 2008, 221.

¹² Aen. Tact. XI 10a-11.

¹³ Diod. Sic. XV 81, 6; Just. *Epit.* XVI 4, 3; Isoc. XV 113. Cf. Burstein 1976, 49, 127 nn. 20, 22; Debord 1999, 296-297, 300.

ter of civil discord (*arbiter civilis discordiae*)¹⁴, he had him imprisoned and then demanded a large ransom to free him. Similarly, he turned his back on the Council that had recalled him and from being a defender of the aristocratic interests became to all effects a patron of the people¹⁵.

Clearchus' fate was probably the same as that of the democrats who openly opposed the aggrandizement of power by the Council of Three Hundred. This does not mean that he could rely on the support of some of his fellow exiles; nor should we consider him as a staunch democrat¹⁶. Although the mention of both his formal condemnation¹⁷, and his need to resort to Mithridates to obtain mercenaries for his return¹⁸ suggest that there had been no expulsion of an entire faction¹⁹, scholars have already stressed that Clearchus' profile, as reconstructed by ancient sources, is compatible with that of the *kalos kagathos* who tactically sides with the democrats as the mutual enemies of oligarchic opponents²⁰.

Some sources report on Clearchus' politics of expulsions after his return to Heraclea, when he established his tyranny²¹. While Theopompus is vague in labelling Clearchus' illegal activities against Pontus, Justin refers to the flight of some councillors to escape to summary arrests ordered by the tyrant and describes the violence of his policies²². Burstein has linked this situation to twelve epitaphs of Heracleotians, who died in Athens from the middle to the end of the fourth century, and they may have belonged to exiles from Heraclea who had fled to Athens as refugees²³. Although it cannot be excluded that they were economic migrants²⁴, what is certain is

¹⁴ *Arbiter civilis discordiae* in Just. *Epit.* XVI 4, 9 corresponds to ἔφορον τῆς αὐθις ὁμονοίας in *Suda*, s.v. Κλέαρχος. Cf. Gallotta 2021, 275-276.

¹⁵ On these events cf. now Gallotta 2019/20.

¹⁶ Saprykin 1997, 132. *Contra* Burstein 1976, 50.

¹⁷ See the use of the participle ἀλώμενος in *Suda*, s.v. Κλέαρχος.

¹⁸ Aen. Tact. XII 5. For tyrants' recourse to mercenaries see Trundle 2006, 69.

¹⁹ That Clearchus returned home at the head of a group of exiles was suggested by Mossé 1962, 7. *Contra* Burstein 1976, 50 n. 28, 127.

²⁰ For Clearchus' frequenting of Plato's Academy in Athens during his exile see Isoc. *Ep.* VII 12; Memnon, *FGrHist* 434 F 1 1,1; *Suda*, s.v. Κλέαρχος. Cf. Burstein 1976, 50.

²¹ On the characteristics of the tyranny of Clearchus as a prefiguration of Hellenistic kingship see Mossé 1962; Saprykin 1997, 134-141. On the introduction of the cult of the sovereign in Heraclea see Muccioli 2011, 128-132.

²² Theop. *FGrHist* 115 F 28 (*apud* Pol. XXXVIII 6, 2); Just. *Epit.* XVI 4, 17; XVI 5, 2 and 5-7. On Clearchus' violence toward his fellow-citizens see also Memnon, *FGrHist* 434 F 1 1, 2.

²³ Burstein 1976, 56, 130 n. 66 with ancient sources.

²⁴ *IG* II² 117b refers to a dispute between merchants. It is an honorific decree for a certain Protomachus, a merchant of unknown origin, who was honoured with *proxenia* and *euergesia* (ll. 10-13). At ll. 19-24 we are told that an Athenian ambassador was to

that a sort of colony of Heracleotians was established in Athens in a period of great instability in Heraclea²⁵.

The problem of the exiles seems to have been one of the main concerns of the regime during Satyrus' regency. Evidence of this can be found in an inscription attesting to an alliance between the cities of Sinope and Heraclea (*I.Sinope* 1). The treaty, which dates from the period 353-346²⁶, was inspired as much by Sinope and Heraclea Pontica's governments' common fear of falling victim to external aggression as by an awareness of the existence of internal threats. The reasons why the two cities formally allied themselves for the first time in their history can be traced with fair certainty to the climate of insecurity in the Black Sea region following the so-called revolt of the satraps²⁷. The treaty includes two clauses concerning the treatment of exiles (ll. 18-23). The first clause concerns the possibility for the exiles from Sinope and Heraclea to remain in the cities where they took refuge (εἶναι αὐτοῖς ἐν ταῖς πόλεσι διατελεῖν) as long as they do not commit crimes (ll. 18-20). The second clause offers guidance in the event that exiles commit crimes in the host cities and stipulates that the parties must send ambassadors into the city which shelters them to order their expulsion, specifying that this provision is valid as soon as the treaty takes effect (ll. 20-23). As I have tried to demonstrate in a forthcoming article, the cities that signed the treaty allowed their exiles to reside in the territory of the partner city and established shared procedures to be adopted in case the exiles committed new crimes against their homeland while they were in the host city, while stipulating that the reception of the exiles did not affect the validity of the alliance²⁸. The exiles in question must have been the individuals

be sent to Heraclea to claim restitution of something (*in lacuna*) unduly withheld by the Heracleotians. Cf. Veligianni Terzi 1997, 63 (A88); Culasso Gastaldi 2004, 147-156.

²⁵ This is also consistent with the presence of *proxenoi* of Heracleotians in Athens (e.g. Kallippus in [Dem.] LII), who were a point of reference for the citizens of Heraclea living as metics in Athens. For the role of the *proxenos* as an «hub» for foreigners in their host city see Mack 2015, 77-80.

²⁶ French 2004, 2.

²⁷ Jefremov 2006; Barat 2012, 226-228; Gallotta 2017; Gallotta 2022, 241-242.

²⁸ Loddo c.d.s. This does not exclude that a part of the exiles found refuge elsewhere, for example in Athens, which was known for its exceptional openness to foreigners and its help for the weak and those in difficulty. For this representation of Athens see Loddo 2022, 27-29. Although some scholars have denied this possibility, preferring to think that the exiles remained in the vicinity of Heraclea (Desideri 1991, followed by Gallotta 2022, 242 and n. 17), it is known that established relations existed between the Heracleotian oligarchs and Athenian philosophical circles, as evidenced by the case of Chion and some members of the Clearchides, such as Timotheus. Furthermore, it is not unusual for exiles to differentiate their choice of exile destination according to the

who fled because of Clearchus, or who were directly expelled by him when he established his tyranny and during the ensuing rule of Satyrus.

2. THE POLITICAL ORIENTATION OF THE FIRST EXILES

But who were the exiles of Heraclea? There are two preliminary considerations to be made. First, it is undeniable that these were dissidents or political exiles who were either expelled following a court order or who left voluntarily from fear and lack of safety at home. Second, we should distinguish a first wave of exiles during the first phase of the tyranny from a second distinctly later wave under Heraclides of Cyme. This means that when the exiles returned in conjunction with the fall of the tyranny, they made up a rather heterogeneous group.

But let's start with the first exiles. Even though Clearchus had been recalled by the oligarchics, his sudden turnaround made the oligarchic faction his main target. Thus, although it cannot be excluded in absolute terms that there were also democrats among the exiles, the oligarchs suffered most of the expulsions. The political orientation of the exiles from Heraclea can be inferred from the circumstances that led to Clearchus' death²⁹. Useful in this regard is a subset of pseudo-historical letters³⁰, known as the *Letters of Chion*. Chion was a relative of Clearchus and, together with Leonides and Euxenon, one of his assassins³¹. He was also a member of the wealthy, intellectual elite. His frequenting of Plato's Academy during his period away from Heraclea suggests that he was among those youths who came to Athens to join a large community of Heracleotians, who had emigrated there for cultural pursuits or as exiles, all however interested in rhetorical and philosophical studies³². Chion certainly was not an exile. Rather, after leaving Heraclea to improve his education and coming into contact with Platonic philosophy, he plausi-

networks and contacts they possessed and the attitude each group showed towards exile, as shown by the case of the Samian exiles. Cf. Loddo 2022, 49-50.

²⁹ On Clearchus' death see Memnon, *FGrHist* 434 F 1 1, 3-4; Just. *Epit.* XVI 5, 12-16; Diod. Sic. XVI 36, 3; *Ep. Chion* 17; *Suda*, s.v. Κλέαρχος. For a careful analysis see Davaze 2013, 171-172.

³⁰ Düring 1951, 14-16 has summarized the reasons for their inauthenticity.

³¹ These are the names recorded by Memnon, *FGrHist* 434 F 1, 3. But Just. *Epit.* XVI 5, 12 mentions Chion and Leonides, who is also nominated in *Suda*, s.v. Κλέαρχος. Lastly, a certain Antitheus is included among the conspirators in *Suda*, s.v. Κλέαρχος. On Chion's thinking see Penwill 2010.

³² Desideri 1991, 20-22. Cf. Cavallo 2019, 48.

bly became a political dissident and nurtured the idea of fighting against Clearchus and freeing his country from the tyrant³³.

The work, dated to the 1st-2nd century³⁴, is an epistolary novel steeped in political philosophy³⁵. Although Chion himself did not write the letters and their content contains fictional elements, scholars have stressed that they reflect historical events concerning Heraclea's fourth-century history³⁶. In particular, Letter 14, addressed to his father Matris and set during Chion's stay in Byzantium and before Clearchus' murder, provides an insight into the political stance of the tyrant's opponents. Chion describes the misfortune of his city as steeped «in bloodshed and exile» (σφαγὰς τε ἀνδρῶν καὶ φυγὰς) and in being deprived of its best citizens (στερομένη μὲν τῶν ἀρίστων πολιτῶν)³⁷. Hence the opposition to Clearchus, which resulted in several failed plots³⁸, seems to have come from the aristocracy, which had first exiled him and later called him back to be the arbiter in the struggle between the Council and the people. Relatives and friends, who had remained at home, aided this group in organizing the downfall of the tyrant³⁹. Clearchus was well aware of the threat to his power posed by the internal opposition, and he had preventively ordered the disarmament of the citizens⁴⁰.

Yet, Clearchus' death did not lead to the overthrow of the tyranny. Burstein is right in believing that while internal opposition had been eliminated, resistance to the tyranny would have meant allowing the exiles to return⁴¹, an unwelcome scenario because it would have entailed the restitution of confiscated property to the exiles and a climate of general instability. Moreover, Satyrus' regency also continued the policy of purging his opponents⁴². Not only did he eliminate those responsible for the conspiracy and their sons, but he also inflicted on many innocent

³³ *Ep. Chion* 12. I do not think we should exclude the possibility that this information is historically accurate.

³⁴ On dating see Düring 1951, 7-25; Malosse 2004, 100-104; Rosenmeyer 2006, 54.

³⁵ For the definition of the *Letters of Chion* as an epistolary novel see Düring 1951, 7. For the relationship of the letters with the Roman cultural debate on the role of philosopher in politics see Lana 1974.

³⁶ Düring 1951, 12; Konstan - Mitsis 1990; Rosenmeyer 2006, 53.

³⁷ *Ep. Chion* 14.

³⁸ Memnon, *FGrHist* 434 F 1 1, 3.

³⁹ *Ep. Chion* 13.

⁴⁰ Isoc. *Ep.* 7, 9.

⁴¹ Burstein 1976, 65; cf. Davaze 2013, 94 n. 90.

⁴² Satyrus' regency is mainly known through Memnon, *FGrHist* FF 1 2, 1-5; in addition, we should consider the mention in Pomp. Trog. XVI and a brief reference in Just. *Epit.* XVI 5, 18. Cf. Burstein 1976, 65-66.

people penalties normally reserved for criminals⁴³. It is not unreasonable to see in these penalties a reference to the imposition of expulsions and exiles. With the end of Satyrus' regency, the exiles' question, having been aggravated by Satyrus' alignment with Clearchus' policy of exiling opponents, remained dramatically open.

3. ALEXANDER THE GREAT AND PERDICCAS AS PATRONS OF THE EXILES

Be that as it may, the exiles imposed under Clearchus and Satyrus lasted a long time, despite the climate of peace that Heraclea experienced under Clearchus' sons, Timotheus and Dionysius. According to Memnon, under Dionysius' rule a delegation of exiles from Heraclea went to Alexander III, begging him to reinstate them in their homeland and to restore their ancestral democracy⁴⁴. Of course, the call for the restoration of the ancestral constitution and the subsequent request for the exiles' return lent itself well to the propaganda and the policy of support for democracies pursued by Alexander in this region in the same period⁴⁵. Diodorus reports that Alexander, after the battle of Granicus, presented himself as the liberator of Greek cities from the Persian yoke⁴⁶. In Ephesus, after promoting the return of the exiles, he abolished the oligarchy and established the democracy⁴⁷. Delegations from Magnesia and Tralles handed over their cities to Alexander, who sent his general Parmenion with orders to overthrow the oligarchies everywhere⁴⁸. In his second letter to the Chians, Alexander contrasted the democracy which he established on the island with the oligarchies imposed by the Barbarians⁴⁹. The link between imposition of democracy and return of the exiles is also evident in Pontus. At Amisus, democracy seems to have been the result of a strong pressure from democratic exiles⁵⁰. This policy, which was a typical feature of Alexander's intervention in Asia Minor, was grounded on the

⁴³ Memnon, *FGrHist* 434 F 1 2, 1.

⁴⁴ Memnon, *FGrHist* 434 F 1 4, 1. See *infra*, § 5.

⁴⁵ Burstein 1976, 72-73. For the use of propaganda by Alexander and his successors see now the essays recently gathered in Baynham - Walsh 2021. For the definition of 'propaganda' applied to the study of Alexander see Baynham 2021.

⁴⁶ Diod. Sic. XVII 24, 1. The topic of the liberation of the Greek cities is combined with that of revenge on the Persians, cf. Squillace 2004, 62-73.

⁴⁷ Arr. *Anab.* I 17.

⁴⁸ Arr. *Anab.* I 18, 1-2.

⁴⁹ *GHI* 84 B, ll. 16-19.

⁵⁰ App. *Mith.* XII 83. Cf. Bosworth 1988a, 222-223, 252; Wallace 2018, 66-68.

assumption that democracy was an expression of anti-Persian sentiments and support of the Macedonian cause, while tyrannies and oligarchic regimes were seen as likely supporters of Persia⁵¹. Memnon does not give a precise date for this embassy but places this request after Alexander was proclaimed King of Asia⁵², namely after 331, at the time of his victory at Gaugamela⁵³; however, the historian adds that if it had not been for Cleopatra's help, Dionysius would have risked losing his power⁵⁴. Scholars have stressed how Cleopatra used her influence on Alexander to plead Dionysius' cause with him⁵⁵. But mention of Cleopatra's mediation should also be used as a *t.p.q.* for the exiles' embassy to Alexander. Although the presence of the exiles at the royal court to solicit Alexander's intervention is a well-known phenomenon⁵⁶, it is hard to imagine that Memnon is referring to two different sets of embassies, one in 331 and another in 324⁵⁷. In any case, while Alexander may have acquiesced to the exiles' requests, at least verbally, it is unlikely that they were able to obtain repatriation on this occasion. Memnon's allusion to Cleopatra's pivotal role rather suggests that the exiles had not yet been allowed to return home by the time Alexander returned from India⁵⁸. The general aim of Alexander's Exile Decree could have enabled them to benefit from it⁵⁹, but it is not clear what the real scope of the implementation of the decree was. First, we have no evidence about the direct effect of this

⁵¹ Wallace 2018, 50-52.

⁵² Plut. *Alex.* 34, 1; *I.Lindos* 2, 105. On the meaning of the title of King of Asia used by Alexander III see the different views of Fredricksmeyer 2000 (Kingship of Asia was not commensurate to Persian kinship, but to a personal, absolute monarchy); Muccioli 2004 (it was an *interpretatio Graeca* of an Achaemenid concept); Nawotka 2012 (it meant the Persian Empire and presupposed the equivalence between Persia and the continent of Asia); Mavrojannis 2017 («Alexander was a Macedonian King who ruled over the Achaemenid Empire», quotation from p. 136).

⁵³ Burstein 1976, 137 n. 41; Davaze 2013, 207-209.

⁵⁴ On Cleopatra, the only blood sister of Alexander III, see Carney 1988, 394-404; D'Agostini 2021, 20-26.

⁵⁵ Carney 1988, 398. Cf. D'Agostini 2021, 25-26 n. 31; Gallotta 2022, 240-241.

⁵⁶ Bosworth 1988a, 222: «There were exiles in plenty at the royal court who agitated constantly for their restoration».

⁵⁷ Burstein 1976, 73, followed by Bittner 1998, 41, has suggested two different embassies, but see the criticism of Davaze 2013, 207-209. Recently Gallotta 2022, 240 has argued for a date just before Alexander's death.

⁵⁸ Burstein 1976, 72-74. Cf. Davaze 2013, 207-209; Wallace 2018, 67.

⁵⁹ Ancient evidence on Alexander's Exiles Decree includes Din. I 82; Hyp. V 18; Diod. Sic. XVII 109, 1 and XVIII 8, 4; Curt. X 2, 4; Plut. *Mor.* 221a; Just. *Epit.* XIII 5, 2-3. The literature on this decree is extensive. Cf. Loddo 2016, 237-238 with previous references.

decree on individual Greek cities⁶⁰. Second, whereas many epigraphic documents are from time to time connected with the decree without any certainty, only in the case of Tegea is there a more explicit support of the exiles' return under the effects the decree⁶¹. There is no denying that the great danger that Dionysius faced should be referred to this chronological context. In this regard, Arrian mentions, in several places in his work, Alexander's plan to carry out an expedition to Pontus⁶². However, the situation of great uncertainty due to Alexander's untimely death may have effectively blocked the implementation of the decree at the local level. Furthermore, the failure of the exiles to return may have been due to Dionysius' political ability and to the support of his partisans, who had taken advantage of the exiles under Clearchus and Satyrus⁶³. Dionysius greeted the news of Alexander's death with great joy, to the point that he had a statue erected to Εὐθυμία⁶⁴, but the problem of the return of the exiles quickly resumed in full force. Perdicas, acting as regent for the successors Philip III Arrhidaius and Alexander IV, addressed the issue in the same way as Alexander, by promoting democracies and supporting the cause of exiles. At the time Perdicas was waging war against Ariarathes to complete the conquest of Cappadocia and Paflagonia⁶⁵, the Heracleotian exiles asked him to help them return to Heraclea⁶⁶. It seems clear from Memnon's words that the exiles failed in their objective. Both Perdicas' careful diplomatic policy and the political intelligence of Dionysius helped to keep the tyranny alive and to postpone the return of the exiles. Memnon fails to explain how Dionysius achieved such a brilliant result, merely saying that he employed the same methods (ταῖς ὁμοίαις μεθόδοις χρώμενος) as before. While it is reasonable to think that Dionysius relied on a strong diplomatic network, it is difficult to identify who helped him. Burstein may be right in assuming that the favourable outcome of the exiles' suit to Dionysius was connected with the alliance

⁶⁰ Dmitriev 2004, 349.

⁶¹ Loddo 2016, 238.

⁶² Arr. *Anab.* IV 15, 4-5; VII 1, 1-3. On Alexander's last plans concerning the Black Sea see Bosworth 1988b, 192.

⁶³ Memnon, *FGrHist* 434 F 1 4, 1. For the reconstruction of Dionysius' profile see now Gallotta 2022.

⁶⁴ Memnon, *FGrHist* 434 F 1 4, 2. While Burstein 1976, 74 has suggested that Dionysius instituted an official cult for Euthymia, Davaze 2013, 211 has explained Dionysius' reaction by his concrete fear of Alexander's revenge.

⁶⁵ Diod. Sic. XVIII 6, 1-3; Arr. *FGrHist* 156 F 1, 11; Plut. *Eum.* 3, 6-7; Just. *Epit.* XIII 6, 1.

⁶⁶ Memnon, *FGrHist* 434 F 1 4, 3.

with Antipater and Craterus against Perdiccas⁶⁷. We probably only know of Dionysius' diplomatic craftiness in wedding Amastris with Craterus' consent (γνώμη τοῦ λιπόντος), a ploy that bolstered the success of the Heracleian tyranny⁶⁸. Amastris was given in marriage to Dionysius after Craterus divorced from her in order to marry Phila, Antipater's daughter⁶⁹. This was Antipater's way of rewarding Craterus for his support in the Lamian War. So, if Perdiccas was a point of reference for the exiles and a hope for their return, it is possible to assume that Dionysius' alliance with Craterus helped repel the threat posed by the exiles perhaps even before 322. In any case, Perdiccas' death extinguished their hopes. We have no information regarding whether and how Poliperchon's 319 edict on the exiles affected Heraclea. Although in the Diodorus' literary paraphrase of the decree the Heracleotians are mentioned among those who were forbidden to restore democracy and repatriate its exiles, scholars agree that they were not from Heraclea Pontica, but Heraclea Trachinia in Thessaly⁷⁰. If we are correct in believing that the *diagramma* was inspired by Philip II's policies and implicitly rejected Alexander's provisions issued after 334, placing the responsibility for them on Antipater⁷¹, it may not have intended to settle situations such as those in Heraclea. To obtain their *kathodos*, the exiles, or better the descendants of the exiles expelled under Clearchus and Satyrus, had to wait for the definitive fall of the tyranny in 282 and its replacement by a democratic government⁷².

4. THE LAST PHASE OF THE TYRANNY AND THE KATHODOS OF THE EXILES

But were the exiles of Heraclea only those exiled under the first tyrants? Although the evidence is rather scant, we can retrace the existence of further exiles during the last phase of the tyranny. After a long, relatively

⁶⁷ Burstein 1976, 75-76.

⁶⁸ Memnon, *FGrHist* 434 F 1 4, 4.

⁶⁹ Diod. Sic. XVIII 18, 8.

⁷⁰ For this decree see Diod. Sic. XVIII 56, 1-8; the clause about Heraclea is at § 5: μὴ κατιέναι δὲ μηδὲ Μεγαλοπολιτῶν τοὺς μετὰ Πολυαινέτου ἐπὶ προδοσίᾳ φεύγοντας μηδ' Ἀμφισσειῶν μηδὲ Τρικκαίων μηδὲ Φαρκαδωνίων μηδὲ Ἡρακλεώτας. Cf. Poddighe 2004, 15 n. 80; 2013, 235, 240 n. 15; Paganoni 2019a, 151 n. 65. *Contra* Ameling 1994, 56.

⁷¹ For this interpretation of the *diagramma* see Poddighe 2013.

⁷² Memnon, *FGrHist* 434 FF 1 6, 1-2; 1 7, 3. I follow the view of Burstein 1976, 87, that the new government in Heraclea was a democracy. *Contra* Davaze 2013, 103.

quiet phase in which the sources record neither attempts by the expelled individuals to return from exile nor further expulsions, the situation seems to change under the rule of Dionysius' sons, Clearchus II and Oxathres. Clearchus is said to have begun to rule Heraclea after Ipsos during the absence of his mother Amastris, whom Lysimachus proposed to remain in Sardis as his queen⁷³. But the need to form an alliance with Ptolemy led Lysimachus to break off his marriage to Amastris and marry Ptolemy's daughter, Arsinoe II⁷⁴. Thus Amastris, while maintaining good relations with her former consort⁷⁵, returned to Heraclea as the widow of Dionysus and mother of the heirs to the throne⁷⁶. Despite her popularity⁷⁷, she allowed her sons to rule over Heraclea and Cierus in her stead, maybe in an attempt to avoid dynastic disputes, and moved to Sesamus, where she founded a city, Amastris, named after her⁷⁸. Clearchus exercised power together with his brother Oxathres, but without the consent that had characterised the rule of his father Dionysius. Torn between their concern for the emergence of internal opposition and the cumbersome presence of their mother, who did not forego interfering in Heraclea's political affairs, Clearchus and Oxathres are credited with having murdered her⁷⁹. More importantly for our discourse, Memnon contrasts their way of handling power with the more measured manner of their father, particularly toward his subjects. The news of Amastris' violent death at the hands of her sons, as Memnon suggests, may have originated in that opposition – it is not known whether this opposition was internal to Heraclea or came about externally from those in exile – to tyrants which regretted the rule of Dionysius. The accusation was sufficient to solicit the intervention of an external power such as Lysimachus, who had maintained a strong link with his former queen, to overthrow the rule of the hated tyrants. Bittner is probably right in suggesting that this mismanagement of power was accompanied by a policy of expulsion of opponents

⁷³ Memnon, *FGrHist* 434 F 1 5, 1. Cf. Burstein 1976, 82.

⁷⁴ Memnon, *FGrHist* 434 F 1 5, 3. On this alliance see Lund 1992, 88. On the marriage policies of the first successors as imitative of the example of Philip II see Grainger 2017, 37-39.

⁷⁵ The conclusion of the marriage did not put an end to the political alliance between Amastris and Lysimachus, as shown by Clearchus' participation to the Getic campaign in 292. Cf. Davaze 2013, 239.

⁷⁶ Memnon, *FGrHist* 434 F 1 4, 9.

⁷⁷ On Amastris' popularity see Müller 2013, 209-210; D'Agostini 2020.

⁷⁸ Memnon, *FGrHist* 434 F 1 4, 9.

⁷⁹ Memnon, *FGrHist* 434 F 1 5, 2. On the moralizing tone of this passage see Dueck 2006, 48.

and resulted in a series of voluntary exiles⁸⁰. A confirmation might come from the wealth accumulated by the tyrants that Lysimachus found when he arrived in Heraclea to avenge the murder of Amastris. I would suggest that the mention of the great wealth of which Lysimachus made booty, at a time when the tyranny appeared less prosperous than in the past – not least because of the loss of some territories under Dionysius⁸¹ – can be interpreted in connection with the policy of expropriation of opponents' property implemented by Clearchus and Oxathres⁸². Furthermore, a new wave of exiles should be placed in the years immediately following Lysimachus' conquest of Heraclea and the passage of the city under the influence of Arsinoe II⁸³. It was immediately clear that the restoration of democracy, however dependent on Lysimachus, would give way to a personalized government. The queen who, after much insistence, had managed to convince Lysimachus to cede the government of Heraclea to her, installed one of his trusted men, Heraclides of Cyeme, as governor. The management of political affairs became the exclusive responsibility of Heraclides and, through him, of Arsinoe⁸⁴, causing Memnon to say that the days of happiness for the Heracleots were over⁸⁵. In particular, the observation that he put many citizens on trial and punished many of them can be interpreted as a reference to his policy of repressing internal opposition⁸⁶. It is not difficult to detect in these words a reference to imprisonment and exile to which, as often happens in situations of this kind, brought voluntary departures in their wake.

Internal conflicts within Lysimachus' court late in his life significantly influenced the course of events in Heraclea. Lysimachus' advanced age, Arsinoe's ambition and her growing aversion to Lysimachus' son Agathocles – the real obstacle to the rise of her son Ptolemy – contributed to the ascendancy of Seleucus in Asia Minor. Agathocles' murder, about which the sources differ, may have been at the basis of old Lysimachus' loss of consensus⁸⁷. Memnon speaks of an understandable resentment (μῖσος δίκαιον) of the Greek cities towards Lysimachus⁸⁸. Pausanias reports

⁸⁰ Bittner 1998, 71.

⁸¹ Burstein 1976, 84-85.

⁸² Memnon, *FGrHist* 434 F 1 5, 3.

⁸³ Memnon, *FGrHist* 434 F 1 5, 4.

⁸⁴ Carney 2013, 37 is likely right in arguing that Arsinoe had «a kind of institutionalized power inside Lysimachus' realm». *Contra* Lund 1992, 194-195.

⁸⁵ On Memnon's hostility toward Arsinoe see Carney 2013, 37 and 138.

⁸⁶ Memnon, *FGrHist* 434 F 1 5, 5.

⁸⁷ On Agathocles' murder see Lund 1992, 195-198; Landucci 1992, 209-214; Carney 2013, 44-48; Davaze 2013, 256-268.

⁸⁸ Memnon, *FGrHist* 434 F 1 5, 7. For the revolts see also Just. *Epit.* XVII 1, 6-8.

that some members of Lysimachus' court, shocked by Agatocles' fate, sought refuge with Seleucus⁸⁹. Although Lund is right to downplay the extent of the cities' revolts after Agatocles' death, it is a fact that this event was at the origin of Seleucus' decision to go to war against Lysimachus⁹⁰, thus breaking the solid alliance that had bound them together since 315⁹¹. The final confrontation between Lysimachus and Seleucus at Curupedium resulted in the end of Lysimachus' rule over Heraclea and the deposing of Arsinoe II's protégé, Heraclides. Lysimachus himself fell in battle, pierced by a javelin thrown by a soldier from Heraclea, Malakon⁹², who was fighting in the ranks of Seleucus' army⁹³. Memnon relates the resumption of the Heracleotians' fight for freedom, pinpointing the news that it was a Heracleotian who struck the fatal blow against Lysimachus⁹⁴. This could be taken as an indication that outcasts from Heraclea had joined the cause of Seleucus, perhaps disappointed about how the situation had evolved after the Clearchids had been eliminated. The preconditions for the return of the exiles should be traced back to this phase. From this moment onwards, the objectives of the exiles and the citizens of Heraclea seem to have converged. When the tyranny of the Clearchids came to an end, both groups identified the rule of Heraclides as an obstacle, for the exiles to their return, and for the citizens to their freedom. It is in this context that we can equate the tyranny of the Clearchids with the rule of Lysimachus, both responsible for depriving the Heracleotians of their freedom, as well as the decision to get rid of Heraclides. Despite the lack of support from the royal couple, Heraclides did not relinquish his power. The citizens of Heraclea tried to convince Heraclides to leave the city by offering him a viaticum (ἐφοδιαζόμενον) and splendid gifts in return. Their plan, evidently, was to avoid an armed confrontation that they were not sure they could win. Faced with his resistance, they decided to undermine the basis of his power by making deal with the garrison leaders – presumably exiles from neighbouring

⁸⁹ Paus. I 10, 4-5. Cf. Davaze 2013, 269-270.

⁹⁰ Lund 1992, 199, followed by Davaze 2013, 268.

⁹¹ Landucci 1992, 211-212, who has linked Seleucus' decision to fight against Lysimachus to Agatocles' murder. Landucci may be right in assuming that Agatocles' death was due to the discovery of a secret agreement between Agatocles, Philetærus, and Seleucus against Lysimachus, as shown by the fact that Lysandra, Agatocles' widow, took refuge with Seleucus after the death of her husband. Cf. *supra*, n. 87.

⁹² For a possible identification see Burstein 1976, 144 n. 56.

⁹³ Memnon, *FGrHist* 434 F 1 5, 7. For the idea that Malakon was an exile, or a mercenary see Lund 1992, 205. In any case, he could not have been part of an official contingent from Heraclea (Landucci 1992, 217-218 n. 202).

⁹⁴ Memnon, *FGrHist* 434 F 1 6, 1.

cities who had turned to mercenary work – promising them equal rights (*isopoliteia*) and the wages that Heraclides had not paid them in return for support against Heraclides⁹⁵. It is uncertain whether the payment of back wages had concerned all the mercenary forces engaged in the garrison or whether for some of them it was tantamount to a bribe⁹⁶, but the *isopoliteia* was likely reserved exclusively for their commanders⁹⁷. Anyway, Heraclides was captured, the walls were torn down, and after they appointed one of them, Phocritus, as governor an embassy was sent to Seleucus. We have no information on the components, content, and objectives of the embassy, but it may have been inspired and led by members of the pro-Seleucid faction. We know that at Ephesus, after Lysimachus' death and the resulting power vacuum, the partisans of Seleucus (τῶν σελευκιζόντων) tore down the walls and flung open the gates to his army, forcing Arsinoe to leave the city in all haste⁹⁸. Heraclea may have faced a similar situation, since Memnon, after reporting the news of the attacks of Zipoites of Bithynia against Heraclea⁹⁹, recalls that Aphrodisius was sent to Phrigia and beyond on behalf of Seleucus¹⁰⁰. Davaze is correct in stating that Aphrodisius, the διοικητής of Seleucus, did not have military duties, as seems to have been the case for why Diodorus sent to Asia Minor¹⁰¹, but was charged with assessing the loyalty of the cities to Seleucus¹⁰². Aphrodisius' report to Seleucus makes it clear that the delegate did not find in Heraclea the same favorable disposition towards Seleucus as in the other cities of the region¹⁰³. Probably in Hera-

⁹⁵ Landucci 1992, 241-242 has stressed that this is the only example of the use of a garrison by Lysimachus in Asia Minor, and was justified by the peculiar situation in Heraclea, where Clearchus II and Oxathres had alienated Lysimachus' sympathies.

⁹⁶ Tober 2013, 360.

⁹⁷ Bittner 1998, 52-53; Davaze 2013, 276-277. *Contra* Saprykin 1997, 182, who has argued that only the *isopoliteia* was granted to the mercenaries since the city was going through a period of economic crisis and would not have been able to disburse so much money.

⁹⁸ Polyaeus, *Strat.* VIII 57. Ephesus was taken by Lysimachus' general Lycus with the aid of the pirates in 286 BC, Polyaeus, *Strat.* V 19; Frontin. III 3, 7. Cf. Landucci 1992, 173; Carney 2013, 47-48. For the date see Lund 1992, 11.

⁹⁹ On this attack see Paganoni 2019b, 31-37. Zipoites' raids had some success and show that Heracleotians had dismissed Heraclides' mercenary troops (cf. Memnon, *FGrHist* 434 F 1 6, 2-3).

¹⁰⁰ Memnon, *FGrHist* 434 FF 1 6, 3; 1 7, 1 with Paganoni 2019b, 31-37. On the Greek matrix of the Hellenistic diplomatic practices see Grainger 2017, 17-18.

¹⁰¹ Pomp. Trog. XVII.

¹⁰² Davaze 2013, 281.

¹⁰³ Mnemon, *FGrHist* 434 F 1 7, 1: Ἡρακλεωτῶν δὲ κατηγορεῖ μὴ εὐνοϊκῶς ἔχειν τοῖς τοῦ Σελεύκου πράγμασιν. On the expression μὴ εὐνοϊκῶς ἔχειν as indicating 'a coded expression of submission' see Ma 1999, 192 with a list of similar instances (p. 193).

clea more than anywhere else there prevailed a latent tension between the Hellenistic monarchs and the incorporated Greek cities¹⁰⁴. While the kings were used to considering the Greek cities as dependent territories over which they could exercise some form of control, the local communities claimed to be looked upon as sovereign, autonomous states. Thus, although a part of the Heracleotians had looked favourably on Seleucus in his fight against Lysimachus, the city was not prepared to give up its freedom again, as it had done first with the tyrants, and then with Lysimachus¹⁰⁵. Such a reluctance to accept a foreign domain again is proven by the outcome of the meeting between Seleucus and the Heracleaotian ambassadors. One of them, Chamaleon, when confronted with Seleucus' demand for submission, replied with a telling sentence «Heracles is *karron*, Seleucus» (Ἡρακλῆς κάρρων, Σέλευκε), where *karron* is a Doric word for stronger¹⁰⁶. So, the Heracleotians, who were revitalised by getting rid of Heraclides, appealed to their founder to assert their independence¹⁰⁷.

The succession of events in Memnon's account suggests that there was a clear connection between the failure of the Heracleotians' embassies to Seleucus¹⁰⁸, their fear of an imminent attack by Seleucus, their search for allies among the neighbouring cities¹⁰⁹, and their decision to allow the exiles to return¹¹⁰. The events in question actually took place over a fairly short period of time between Lysimachus' death at Curupedium (February 281) and the death of Seleucus (August or September 281)¹¹¹. Memnon's silence about the activities of the exiles after Perdicas' death and until their final return suggests not only that during the period when Heraclea was under Lysimachus' influence there were no significant events concerning them but also that the ruler did not favour their cause. On the contrary, Seleucus may have exerted leverage on both the claims of the exiles and the presence of a pro-Seleucid faction in

¹⁰⁴ Heuss 1937, 208-209; Mehl 1986, 307.

¹⁰⁵ Mehl 1986, 312; Saprykin 2020, 226-227.

¹⁰⁶ Memnon, *FGrHist* 434 F 1 7, 1. Memnon explains κάρρων by the term ισχυρότερος, but Davaze 2013, 283 has argued that the explication was added by Photius, as Memnon would not have needed to do it.

¹⁰⁷ For Heraclea's claim of its Doric origins see Dana 2011, 243-246 and Dana 2019, 69-70.

¹⁰⁸ Memnon, *FGrHist* 434 F 1 7, 1.

¹⁰⁹ According to Memnon, *FGrHist* 434 F 1 7, 2, embassies were sent to Mithridates, King of Pontus, Byzantium and Chalcedon. On the reciprocity of this alliance see Prandi 2020, 85-86.

¹¹⁰ Memnon, *FGrHist* 434 F 1 7, 3.

¹¹¹ For the dates see Bittner 1998, 69.

Heraclea in his fight against Lysimachus. Scholars have already suggested that Seleucus, at the time of the struggle with Lysimachus, had made contact with the Heracleotian exiles, promising them a return home in exchange for military support¹¹². His strategy, which was grounded on the understanding that politics in Greek cities were generally a *Parteipolitik*¹¹³, would have been to support the dissidents in their claims to return to govern in Heraclea in order to secure a friendly government there¹¹⁴. This reconstruction, largely speculative, can find a small confirmation in the presence of Heracleotes in Seleucus' army. It is therefore in this original dynamic that the cause of the return of the Heracleotian exiles is to be sought. While Bittner has insisted on the central role of Seleucus in the return of the exiles, it should be emphasised that this return is presented by Memnon not so much as an imposition of a foreign power on the Heracleotians, but as the result of an agreement between the government of Heraclea and the exiles¹¹⁵. The agreement seems to have all the earmarks of an amnesty¹¹⁶, whose terms were negotiated by Nymphis, the leader (*hyparchos*) of the surviving exiles¹¹⁷. Nymphis, a descendant of the first exiles, was a scholar and a politician, who is credited with composing a work in 24 books *On Alexander, the Diadochoi, and the Epigonoï*, and a treatise in 13 books *On Heraclea*¹¹⁸. Along with Domitius Kallistratus, Nymphis is the main source of Memnon's work and mainly responsible for his patriotic tone¹¹⁹. Although it is fair to point out that the description of events suffers from the partiality of the reporting source, there is no reason to question its reliability. Likewise, there is no need to doubt that the event he alludes to, namely the return of the exiles, took place in a non-violent manner, even if Memnon describes the newfound unity of the city in emphatic, idealised tones¹²⁰. The happiness (*eudaimonia*) of which Memnon speaks is the result of the agreement between the parties, i.e. the exiles' waiving their claim to the property confiscated from them and the Heracleotians' willingness to provide for the maintenance of the returnees. One might question this reconstruc-

¹¹² Bittner 1998, 69 building upon some general observations Heuss 1937, 208-209 on Seleucus' policy towards the Greek cities.

¹¹³ Heuss 1937, 209.

¹¹⁴ Bittner 1998, 69.

¹¹⁵ Bittner 1998, 69.

¹¹⁶ Rubinstein 2013, 159.

¹¹⁷ On the role of Nymphis in the negotiating the exiles' return see Burstein 1976, 88-89; Heinemann 2010, 45-46; Davaze 2013, 103, 288-283.

¹¹⁸ Nymphis, *FGrHist* 432 T 1 = *Suda*, s.v. Νύμφις. Cf. *supra*, n. 4.

¹¹⁹ Cf. *supra*, n. 4. For Memnon's patriotism see Davaze 2013, 45-54.

¹²⁰ Memnon's narrative has been defined as tragic by Tober 2013, 347.

tion as influenced by an *ex-post* reading of Nymphis that Memnon could have accepted uncritically, but the exiles' decision to forego taking possession of their confiscated assets is understandable as much as the same request for this by the Heracleotians. After all, the problem of returning the confiscated property to the returnees was often the main obstacle to their return. Giving in to the Heracleotians' request not to make any demands on their previous property meant in fact removing an important stumbling block in reaching an accord. While the decision of the exiles is understandable, at first glance the position of the Heracleotians is less so. Why did they accept the return of the exiles at such a time of crisis? While they had freed themselves from the heavy influence of Lysimachus, they now had to face the danger posed by the growing pressure of Seleucus and counter the aggression of Zipoites. One possible explanation is that they feared Seleucus' alliance with the exiles. Heraclea had already experienced this situation in the past, since the exiles often sought the influence of foreign potentates in order to strengthen their hand for returning to their homeland, and at times even to be reinstated in power. For their part, the foreign powers often agreed to support the demands of the exiles both because they shared their political orientation and because, in so doing, secured a friendly government. Moreover, the fight with Zipoites may have made it necessary to expand their military base. If it is correct to hypothesize that the Heracleotians liquidated the mercenaries of Heraclides' garrison, it must be admitted that the defence of the city was entrusted essentially to the citizens. The additional exiles cast out during the last phase of the tyranny and under Heraclides' rule may have dangerously depleted the population. Thus, the return of the exiles can be interpreted as a measure to strengthen the city's military potential. At bottom, all the parties stood to gain: the exiles got their longed-for return, and the city was strengthened. Nymphis-Memnon's patriotic tone, which emphasises the new concord – the result of the exiles' efforts to recover what their ancestors had been deprived of and the friendship shown to them by the residents, who did their utmost to ensure that the returnees had everything they needed – seems plausible enough. The joint efforts of both the parties justified the success of the amnesty in Heraclea, as the city did not experience any further internal dissensions for centuries to come.

5. THE EXILES BETWEEN TYRANNY AND DEMOCRACY

Memnon concludes his narrative about the *phygades* of Heraclea by stating that after the exiles' return the Heracleotians regained their former nobility and form of government (τῆς παλαιᾶς εὐγενείας τε καὶ πολιτείας ἐπελαμβάνοντο)¹²¹. This final remark allows us to make some observations about the political orientation of the exiles and to provide an answer to the question we posed in the introduction. Memnon twice associates them with democracy, first in the context of the exiles' interactions with Alexander, when he says that they petitioned the King to grant their return to their homeland and its restoration of democracy¹²², and second when reporting, though not explicitly, on the return of the exiles to Heraclea, saying only that after the return of the exiles, the Heracleotians recovered their ancient nobility and the (traditional?) form of government¹²³. Although he does not explicitly mention democracy, it can be inferred from the fact that Heraclea had been governed democratically before the tyranny was established, and that in 324 the exiles had sought to restore democracy during the tyranny of Dionysius. The first mention of democracy refers to a time when tyranny had already been in force in Heraclea for 40 years. The second reference is placed not only after the end of the dynastic tyranny of the Clearchids but also after the end of Lysimachus' influence on Heraclea. It should be added, however, that at midpoint Memnon further alludes to democracy in speaking of the relations between Lysimachus and Heraclea. In that case, the elimination of the tyrants, Clearchus II and Oxathres, and the fall of the city into the sphere of influence of Lysimachus had coincided with the promise of the political autonomy, in particular the Heracleotians were allowed to govern themselves democratically. However, as we have already said, political autonomy and self-determination remained an empty promise and the Heracleotians had to come to terms with a new form of authoritarian government. If so, democracy in Heraclea was suspended in 364 and was not restored until 281, in conjunction with the return of the exiles. Yet it is worth noting that the exiles are linked to democracy in Memnon's account. We know with certainty that there were at least two waves of exiles, the first under Clearchus and Satyrus and the second under Heraclides of Cyme. On the orientation of those expelled under Heraclides we have no precise information. They may

¹²¹ Memnon, *FGrHist* 434 F 1 7, 4.

¹²² Memnon, *FGrHist* 434 F 1 4, 1.

¹²³ Memnon, *FGrHist* 434 F 1 7, 4.

have been patriots, who opposed to Heraclides' authoritarianism, or simply wealthy individuals whose property Heraclides coveted. On the contrary, the first expulsions mainly affected the members of Heraclea's governing Council in what seems to have been a moderate democracy. The Council most likely represented the aristocratic/oligarchic component of the constitution, but it was also the main target of the opponents of the regime. It is therefore unlikely that the exiled councillors harboured genuinely democratic feelings and were not rather oligarchs, who became opponents of tyranny, since they considered that form of government to be the main cause of their fate as exiles. As we have seen above, both their destinations in exile and their membership of Athenian philosophical circles point to an oligarchic orientation. So, why Memnon relate these exiles with democracy? At least two not mutually exclusive explanations are possible. The first is that the exiles actually used the argument of democracy in their negotiations with Alexander, despite their not being sincerely democratic. We have already said that on that occasion the exiles begged Alexander to help them to return and restore their ancestral democracy (*patrios demokratia*)¹²⁴. In this case, the use of democracy was instrumental, aimed at securing Alexander's support in their plan to return to Heraclea. Since the liberation of the cities of Asia Minor and the overthrow of tyrannies in favour of democracies were one of the cornerstones of Alexander's propaganda, the exiles would have co-opted these demands. What they meant by democracy is not easy to say. Even if recent scholarship has rightly stressed that democracy, far from being just a word devoid of meaning, continued to be a widespread and important form of government in Hellenistic times, the question arises as to whether the exiles really intended to establish or support a democracy once they returned in Heraclea and installed themselves in its government¹²⁵. It is likely that their references to democracy should be understood as expressing their will to restore the form of government that had been in force prior to the tyranny. If so, democracy was merely the antonym of tyranny, i.e. a form of government in which citizens could govern themselves freely and autonomously, as opposed to a regime such as tyranny in which these rights were denied. In this perspective, reference to democracy was synonymous with the *patrios politeia*. Already Tarn, on

¹²⁴ Memnon, *FGrHist* 434 F 1 4, 1.

¹²⁵ For this view of Hellenistic democracies as working as real democracies seamlessly with the Classical period see Carlsson 2005 and Grieb 2008, but see also Mann 2012 for some criticism of these approaches.

the basis of some literary and epigraphic instances of this expression¹²⁶, has argued that between the 3rd and 2nd centuries any reference to the *patrios politeia* was used as an antithesis of tyrannical rule and that the liberation of cities from tyrants was accompanied by the restoration of their ancestral constitutions¹²⁷. A second explanation is that the use of democracy in Memnon's narrative derives from an *ex post* interpretation of the events related to the exiles. In other words, the historian, probably drawing from Nymphis, reinterprets the experience of exile as a struggle for the return and restoration of the ancestral constitution; in so doing, he identifies democracy as the ancestral constitution in Heraclea and backdates its introduction to the origins of the city¹²⁸. In fact, the two interpretations could coexist, if we consider that Nymphis drew on the accounts of the exiles to write his history of Heraclea; hence the exiles could make recourse to the issue of democracy and waved it as a banner in their dialogue with Alexander, but in point of fact such a democracy was nothing more than a platitude. This is confirmed by the juxtaposition of the form of the restored government with the ancient nobility of the Heracleotians. It has been rightly noted that *eugeneia* is hardly a value compatible with democracy¹²⁹. If, as I believe, one must exclude the possibility that nobility should be associated with the status of the exiles or with a moral prerogative of theirs, a kind of requirement of excellence, hence nobility can be seen as the hallmark of the ancestral constitution's restoration¹³⁰. That nobility, which Memnon qualifies as ancient (*palaia*), would allude to the ancient prestige that the city regained when it returned to its traditional form of government. To answer the question, we have asked in the opening section of this paper, we can reconcile the exiles' request for the restoration of democracy with their oligarchic feelings if we consider the specious and deliberately ambiguous nature of this request. Rather than a sincere attachment to democratic ideals or a betrayal of the exiles' class consciousness, the insistence on the link between return to their homeland and restoration of democracy shows that the exiles knew the polysemy of a contested concept, that which is 'ancestral' (*patrios*), whether it be the constitution in general (*politeia*) or a particular form of government (*demokratia*), and knew how to exploit

¹²⁶ Pol. II 47; II 70, IX 36; Plut. *Dem.* 8 and 10; Plut. *Tit.* 10; IG II³, 1 912, ll. 15-16 with Waterfield 2021, 159-162.

¹²⁷ Tarn 1969 (1913), 437-438. For the use of the slogan of *patrios politeia* in the Hellenistic period see Quaß 1979.

¹²⁸ On Nymphis' role as a source see *supra*, n. 4.

¹²⁹ Bittner 1998, 76-77.

¹³⁰ Heuss 1937, 236-237; Bittner 1998, 76-77; Davaze 2013, 294-295.

it in their political relations, first with Alexander and Perdicas, later with Seleucus, and lastly with the Heracleotians. The so fleeting ideal of *patrios demokratia* with which Memnon concludes his account of the exiles of Heraclea, one of the cardinal principles on which to conclude the amnesty, proves to be the key to a peaceful communal life.

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