Appendix

A Robustness checks

A.1 Placebo reforms in any year between 1990 and 2000

This section documents that no other statistically significant effects can be estimated by applying the same regression model to other *placebo* reforms that would have occurred in any year between 1990 and 2000. The results in Appendix Figure A.1 also confirm that the estimates are not confounded by gender quotas for selecting members of the municipal council since their abolition (after the 1995 election but before the 1996 election) does not cause any statistically significant effect. The coefficient for the placebo reform occurring in 1996 is indeed precisely estimated at zero.




Figure A.1: Placebo coefficients

Notes: The dependent variable is $FemaleMayor_{i,t}$, an indicator equal to 1 if the mayor in office is a woman. Estimation method: 2SLS as in equations (3) and (4) where, at each iteration, the treatment indicator $PostReform_{i,t}$ has been replaced with an indicator $\mathbb{1}(\widehat{ElYear}_{i,t} \geq k)$, where each $k \in \{1990, \ldots, 2000\}$ is specified in the horizontal axis label. Consistently, the instrument $\mathbb{1}(ElYear_{i,t-5} \geq 1988)$ has been replaced with an indicator $\mathbb{1}(ElYear_{i,t-5} \geq k-5)$. The specifications include linear time trends specific to each cohort of municipalities as in columns (2) and (5) of Table 3. 95% confidence intervals are based on standard errors robust to clustering at the municipality level. The coefficient for 1993 represents the estimated effect of direct election presented in column (5) of Table 3.

A.2 Robustness to other shocks that hit municipalities around the timing of the reform: property tax

This section excludes the possibility that the results are driven by the concurrent introduction of a municipal property tax that has previously been shown to affect political selection (Bordignon et al., 2020). The introduction of the municipal property tax ICI should not affect the estimates since it was introduced in 1993 throughout the country. Nevertheless, in Table A.1, I augment the specification with controls for predictors of each municipality's exposure to the newly-introduced local property tax used in the literature (Bianchi et al., 2023; Bordignon et al., 2020) interacted with time dummies. Specifically, I add controls for i) the pre-reform transfers received by the municipality, ii) the share of buildings constructed before WWII, iii) the provincial GDP in 1992, and iv) the revenues from a temporary property tax levied in 1992, all interacted with time dummies.

Table A.1: Robustness to introduction of local property tax

	2SLS					
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
	Female Mayor	Female Mayor	Female Mayor	Female Mayor	Female Mayor	Female Mayor
Post Reform	0.024***	0.024***	0.025***	0.023***	0.025***	0.023***
	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.007)
Observations	116,671	116,707	137,065	137,632	134,451	116,192
R^2	0.001	0.001	0.001	0.003	0.001	0.004
Year Effects	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Municipality Fixed Effects	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Cohort × linear trends	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Transfers1992 × Year	✓					✓
Yearly Transfers		✓				✓
Share Pre-WW2 Buildings × Year			✓			✓
Province GDP × Year				✓		✓
ISI1992 × Year					✓	✓
Control mean	0.0350	0.0350	0.0350	0.0350	0.0350	0.0350

Notes: The dependent variable is $FemaleMayor_{i,t}$, an indicator equal to 1 if the mayor in office is a woman. In column (1), the specification is augmented with the interaction between the total amount of transfers received by the municipality in 1992 and year dummies; in column (2), the specification is augmented with controls for the yearly total amount of transfers received by the municipality; in column (3), the specification is augmented with the interaction between the share of housing built before WWII and year dummies; in column (4), the specification is augmented with the interaction between provincial GDP and year dummies; in column (5), the specification is augmented with the interaction between the amount of municipality tax revenues from the 1992 version of the property tax and year dummies. Finally, in column (6), the specification is augmented with all the controls included in columns (1)–(5). Standard errors robust to clustering at the municipality level are in parentheses. *,**,*** represent the 10%, 5%, 1% significance levels.

A.3 Robustness to other shocks that hit municipalities around the timing of the reform: dissolution of largest parties

This section excludes the possibility that the empirical results are driven by the quasi-concurrent dissolution of Italy's largest parties. Three of the main parties that shared government responsibilities at the national or local level in post-World War II Italy dissolved after the end of the Soviet Union and a major corruption scandal that hit many national political leaders in the early 1990s. Daniele et al. (2020) estimate that mayors belonging to parties hit by the corruption scandal were more likely to be unseated and replaced than mayors belonging to other parties. The dissolution of the major parties should not affect the estimates since none of them were dissolved exactly at the same time as the voting system reform (i.e., after the 1992 local election and before the 1993 local election).

Table A.2: Robustness to dissolution of major parties

	2SLS			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
	Female Mayor	Female Mayor	Female Mayor	Female Mayor
Post Reform	0.030***	0.027***	0.024***	0.027***
	(0.008)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.008)
Post Reform × DC Mayor 1990	–0.006			–0.004
	(0.006)			(0.007)
Post Reform × PCI Mayor 1990		–0.015		–0.015
		(0.015)		(0.015)
Post Reform × PSI Mayor 1990			0.015**	0.012
			(0.007)	(0.009)
Observations	136,457	136,457	136,457	136,457
R^2	0.001	0.001	0.001	0.001
Year Effects	✓	✓	✓	✓
Municipality Fixed Effects	✓	✓	✓	✓
Cohort × linear trends	✓	✓	✓	✓
Control mean	0.0340	0.0340	0.0340	0.0340

Notes: The dependent variable is $FemaleMayor_{i,t}$, an indicator equal to 1 if the mayor in office is a woman. In column (1), the specification is augmented with the interaction between an indicator equal to 1 if the mayor serving during the year 1990 belonged to the Christian Democratic party (DC) and the $PostReform_{i,t}$ dummy; in column (2), the specification is augmented with the interaction between an indicator equal to 1 if the mayor serving during the year 1990 belonged to the Italian Communist Party (PCI) and the $PostReform_{i,t}$ dummy; in column (3), the specification is augmented with the interaction between an indicator equal to 1 if the mayor serving during the year 1990 belonged to the Italian Socialist Party (PSI) and the $PostReform_{i,t}$ dummy. All interaction terms are instrumented as in the main specification. Finally, in column (4), the specification is augmented with all the controls included in columns (1)–(3). Standard errors robust to clustering at the municipality level are in parentheses. *,**,*** represent the 10%, 5%, 1% significance levels.

Nevertheless, in Table A.2, I interact the model with an indicator equal to 1 if the incumbent mayor in 1992 was a member of the Christian Democrats (DC), the Communist

Party (PCI), or the Socialist Party (PSI), respectively, to provide reassurance that the results are not driven by the replacement of incumbent mayors that belonged to parties that were dissolved during their period in office.

B Additional figures and tables

Table B.1: Length of mayor's office by gender

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
	Length of mayoral term			log(Length)
Female	–83.292***	–134.475***	–94.156***	–0.079***
	(26.218)	(29.450)	(27.578)	(0.029)
Observations	13,800	13,800	13,800	13,800
R^2	0.001	0.768	0.796	0.745
Year Effects		✓	✓	✓
Municipality Fixed Effects		✓	✓	✓
Age and education			✓	✓
Control mean	1481	1481	1481	7.204

Notes: The table reports descriptive associations between the length of mayors' spell in office and observable characteristics of mayors serving before the introduction of direct mayoral elections. The unit of observation is a term. Column (1) reports the results from a regression in which the length (in days) of the mayoral term is regressed against the gender of the mayor. Column (2) augments the specification in column (1) with municipality and election-year fixed effects. Column (3) augments the specification in column (2) with controls for the share of women sitting in the municipal council as well as for age, education dummies, and experience dummies of the mayor. Column (4) replicates the specification in column (3) using the logarithmic transformation of the length (in days) of the mayoral term as the dependent variable. Standard errors robust to clustering at the municipality level are in parentheses. *,**,*** represent the 10%, 5%, 1% significance levels.




Figure B.1: Distribution of elections around the reform and 5 years prior to the reform

Notes: Distribution of elections held in each year during the 1988–1992 cycle (panel (a)) and during the 1993–1997 cycle (panel (b)).

Table B.2: Descriptive Statistics

	(1)	(2)	(3)
Variable	Mean	St. Dev.	Obs.
(a) Mayor and Council characteristics			
Female Mayor	0.064	0.246	137,718
College Mayor	0.407	0.491	137,718
Age Mayor	46.572	9.858	137,718
Female Councilors	0.148	0.112	137,718
High-skill job Mayor	0.138	0.345	137,718
Re-elected Incumbent	0.331	0.471	137,718
Same Party	0.866	0.340	131,483
(b) Election and City characteristics			
Post Reform	0.635	0.481	137,718
Instrument	0.641	0.480	137,718
First year of treatment	1,994.674	0.829	137,718
First year of predicted treatment	1,994.538	1.080	137,718
Year	1,997.176	6.490	137,718
Population	6,624.680	43,208.263	137,718
Surface (km^2)	33.070	45.941	137,718
Population density (inh./km^2)	278.498	629.428	137,718
Gender gaps in educ. attainment	112.131	26.847	137,718
Sex ratio	96.487	6.128	137,718
Female employment rate	29.547	8.612	137,718
(c) Pre-reform characteristics			
Female Councilors (1992)	0.082	0.066	137,718
Female Councilors in majority party (1992)	0.078	0.101	137,718
Female Councilors in minority parties (1992)	0.083	0.099	137,718
College Mayor (1992)	0.371	0.483	137,718
High School Mayor (1992)	0.437	0.496	137,718
Junior School Mayor (1992)	0.193	0.395	137,718
Vote share of DC (1992)	0.343	0.129	137,718
Vote share of PDS (1992)	0.138	0.102	137,718
Vote share of PSI (1992)	0.138	0.080	137,718
Vote share of LEGA (1992)	0.126	0.113	137,718
Vote share of RC (1992)	0.053	0.037	137,718
Vote share of MSI (1992)	0.040	0.030	137,718

Notes: All mayors serving in municipalities belonging to ordinary regions between 1986 and 2008.

Table B.3: First stage and reduced form

	First-stage			Reduced form		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
	Post Reform	Post Reform	Post Reform	Female Mayor	Female Mayor	Female Mayor
Instrument	0.748***	0.811***	0.811***	0.026***	0.020***	0.019***
	(0.013)	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)
Observations	137,718	137,718	137,718	137,718	137,718	137,718
R^2	0.978	0.982	0.982	0.000	0.000	0.004
Year Effects	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Municipality Fixed Effects	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Cohort × linear trends		✓	✓		✓	✓
Time-varying covs			✓			✓
Pre-determined covs × Year			✓			✓
Control mean	0.00300	0.00300	0.00300	0.0340	0.0340	0.0340
F-stat	3553	6180	6180			

Notes: In columns (1)–(3), the dependent variable is $PostReform_{i,t}$, an indicator equal to 1 if the municipality is subject to the direct election regime. In columns (4)–(6), the dependent variable is $FemaleMayor_{i,t}$, an indicator equal to 1 if the mayor in office is a woman. In column (1), the estimated equation is (4). Column (2) augments the specification in column (1) with linear trends specific to each cohort of municipalities. Column (3) augments the specification in column (2) with controls for each municipality's surface, population density, gender differences in educational attainment, population, sex ratio, female employment rate (all measured in the 1991 population census) as well as the pre-reform share of women in the municipal council interacted with year dummies, educational attainment of the pre-reform incumbent mayor interacted with year dummies, and vote share of the main parties in 1992 national elections interacted with year dummies. In column (4), the estimated equations are the reduced form associated with the 2SLS specification in equations (3) and (4). Column (5) augments the specification in column (4) with linear trends specific to each cohort of municipalities. Column (6) augments the specification in column (5) with controls for each municipality's surface, population density, gender differences in educational attainment, population, sex ratio, female employment rate (all measured in the 1991 population census) as well as the pre-reform share of women in the municipal council interacted with year dummies, educational attainment of the pre-reform incumbent mayor interacted with year dummies, and vote share of the main parties in 1992 national elections interacted with year dummies. Standard errors robust to clustering at the municipality level are in parentheses. *,**,*** represent the 10%, 5%, 1% significance levels.

Table B.4: Difference-in-Differences estimates at the municipality-term level

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
	OLS				2SLS			
	Share of term with a female mayor	Female first mayor	Female last mayor	Share of female mayors	Share of term with a female mayor	Female first mayor	Female last mayor	Share of female mayors
Post Reform	0.016**	0.018**	0.012	0.015**	0.026***	0.029***	0.022**	0.025***
	(0.007)	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.007)	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.009)
Observations	32,541	32,541	32,541	32,541	32,541	32,541	32,541	32,541
R^2	0.337	0.332	0.337	0.337	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000
Municipality Fixed Effects	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Term-position Fixed Effects	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Control mean	0.0344	0.0330	0.0365	0.0348	0.0344	0.0330	0.0365	0.0348
First-stage F					7257	7257	7257	7257

Notes: The unit of observation is a municipality–electoral-term. In columns (1) and (5), the dependent variable is the share of years within the term in which the mayor in office is a woman. In columns (2) and (6), the dependent variable is an indicator taking the value 1 if the first mayor observed during the term is a woman, and zero otherwise. In columns (3) and (7), the dependent variable is an indicator taking the value 1 if the last mayor observed during the term is a woman. In columns (4) and (8), the dependent variable is the share of mayors observed during the term who are women. Columns (1)–(4) report OLS estimates while Columns (5)–(8) report 2SLS estimates in which $PostReform$ is instrumented using scheduled exposure to the reform. All specifications include municipality fixed effects and fixed effects for the position of the term in each municipality's observed electoral sequence. Standard errors robust to clustering at the municipality level are reported in parentheses. *, **, and *** represent the 10%, 5%, and 1% significance levels.

Table B.5: Robustness to introduction of gender quotas – Refined definition of exposure

	2SLS				
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
	Female Mayor	Female Mayor	Female Mayor	Female Mayor	Female Mayor
Post Reform	0.025***	0.049***	0.068	0.048***	0.107**
	(0.007)	(0.012)	(0.043)	(0.013)	(0.054)
Post Reform × Before Abolition	0.006			0.005	–0.057
	(0.006)			(0.012)	(0.049)
Post Reform × $\overline{\text{Exposure}}$		–0.135***		–0.135**	
		(0.046)		(0.052)	
Post Reform × $\overline{\text{Exposure}}$ × Before Abolition				–0.011	
				(0.057)	
Post Reform × 1($\overline{\text{Exposure}} \geq 0$)			–0.045		–0.028
			(0.043)		(0.046)
Post Reform × 1($\overline{\text{Exposure}} \geq 0$) × Before Abo					–0.063
					(0.049)
Observations	137,718	137,718	137,718	137,718	137,718
R^2	0.001	0.001	0.001	0.001	0.001
Year Effects	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Municipality Fixed Effects	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Cohort × linear trends	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Control mean	0.0350	0.0350	0.0350	0.0350	0.0350

Notes: The dependent variable is $FemaleMayor_{i,t}$, an indicator equal to 1 if the mayor in office is a woman. The estimated equations are (3) and (4) augmented with linear trends specific to each cohort of municipalities. Column (1) includes the interaction term $PostReform_{i,t} \times BeforeAbolition_{i,t}$. Column (2) includes the interaction term $PostReform_{i,t} \times \overline{Exposure_i}$. Column (3) includes the interaction term $PostReform_{i,t} \times \mathbb{1}(\overline{Exposure_i} \geq 0)$. Column (4) includes the interaction terms $PostReform_{i,t} \times BeforeAbolition_{i,t}$, $PostReform_{i,t} \times \overline{Exposure_i}$, and $PostReform_{i,t} \times BeforeAbolition_{i,t} \times \overline{Exposure_i}$. Column (5) includes the interaction terms $PostReform_{i,t} \times BeforeAbolition_{i,t}$, $PostReform_{i,t} \times \mathbb{1}(\overline{Exposure_i} \geq 0)$, and $PostReform_{i,t} \times BeforeAbolition_{i,t} \times \mathbb{1}(\overline{Exposure_i} \geq 0)$. $BeforeAbolition_{i,t}$ is an indicator variable taking values 1 for all elections held in 1993 or after 1993 and before September 6, 1995. $\overline{Exposure_i}$ is defined as in (7) and $\mathbb{1}(\overline{Exposure_i} \geq 0)$ takes the value 1 if $\overline{Exposure_i} \geq 0$. Standard errors robust to clustering at the municipality level are in parentheses. *,**,*** represent the 10%, 5%, 1% significance levels.

Table B.6: Heterogeneity by macro-region

	North-West	North-East	Central Italy	South
		2SLS		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
	Female Mayor	Female Mayor	Female Mayor	Female Mayor
Post Reform	0.032***	0.058**	0.023	0.005
	(0.012)	(0.024)	(0.019)	(0.011)
Observations	62,972	19,870	20,844	34,032
R^2	0.000	0.003	0.008	0.002
Year Effects	✓	✓	✓	✓
Municipality Fixed Effects	✓	✓	✓	✓
Cohort × linear trends	✓	✓	✓	✓
Control mean	0.0440	0.0460	0.0290	0.0130

Notes: The dependent variable is $FemaleMayor_{i,t}$, an indicator equal to 1 if the mayor in office is a woman. Estimation method: 2SLS as in equations (3) and (4). In column (1), the sample is restricted to municipalities belonging to Piedmont, Lombardy, and Liguria regions. In column (2), the sample is restricted to municipalities belonging to Veneto and Emilia-Romagna regions; in column (3), the sample is restricted to municipalities belonging to Tuscany, Umbria, Lazio, Marche, and Abruzzo regions; in column (4), the sample is restricted to municipalities belonging to Molise, Campania, Basilicata, Calabria, and Puglia regions. Standard errors robust to clustering at the municipality level are in parentheses. *,**,*** represent the 10%, 5%, 1% significance levels.

Table B.7: Heterogeneous effects by pre-reform gender norms

	OLS				2SLS			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
	Female Mayor	Female Mayor	Female Mayor	Female Mayor	Female Mayor	Female Mayor	Female Mayor	Female Mayor
Post Reform	0.015***	0.014**	0.015***	0.015***	0.028***	0.027***	0.027***	0.027***
	(0.005)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.008)
Post Reform × Diff. employment rate (std.)	–0.007***			–0.007***	–0.007***			–0.007***
	(0.002)			(0.002)	(0.002)			(0.002)
Post Reform × share against abortion (std.)		–0.009***		–0.004		–0.009***		–0.005
		(0.003)		(0.005)		(0.003)		(0.005)
Post Reform × share against divorce (std.)			–0.010***	–0.006			–0.010***	–0.006
			(0.003)	(0.004)			(0.003)	(0.004)
Observations	137,718	134,555	134,375	134,375	137,718	134,555	134,375	134,375
R^2	0.346	0.347	0.347	0.348	0.000	0.000	0.001	0.001
Year Effects	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Municipality Fixed Effects	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Cohort × linear trends	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Control mean	0.0350	0.0350	0.0350	0.0350	0.0350	0.0350	0.0350	0.0350

Notes: The dependent variable is $FemaleMayor_{i,t}$, an indicator equal to 1 if the mayor in office is a woman. The table examines heterogeneity in the effect of direct election with respect to three predetermined proxies for local gender norms. The gender gap in employment rates is measured using the 1991 Population Census. The shares against abortion and divorce are municipal vote shares in favor of the restrictive 1981 abortion referendum and in favor of the 1974 referendum to repeal the right to divorce law. All three variables are standardized to have mean zero and standard deviation one, and are oriented so that higher values indicate more traditional gender norms. Columns (1)–(3) report OLS specifications that interact $PostReform_{i,t}$ with each measure separately, while column (4) includes all three interactions jointly. Columns (5)–(8) report the corresponding 2SLS specifications. In the 2SLS models, $PostReform_{i,t}$ and its interactions with the measures of gender norms are instrumented using scheduled reform exposure and the corresponding interactions with the same predetermined municipal characteristics. All specifications include municipality fixed effects, calendar-year fixed effects, and treatment-cohort-specific linear trends. Standard errors robust to clustering at the municipality level are reported in parentheses. *, **, and *** represent the 10%, 5%, 1% significance levels.

Table B.8: Heterogeneous effects by pre-reform educational attainment of the local population

	OLS		2SLS			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	1	1
	Female Mayor	Female Mayor	Female Mayor	Female Mayor	2	2
Post Reform	0.014***		0.027***		15	3
	(0.005)		(0.008)		16	4
Post Reform × share population with high-school degree (std.)	0.006**		0.006**		17	5
	(0.003)		(0.003)		18	6
Post Reform × College		0.005		0.017*	3	7
		(0.007)		(0.009)	4	8
Post Reform × High-school		0.020***		0.030***	5	9
		(0.007)		(0.009)	6	10
Post Reform × Less than high school		0.039***		0.050***	7	11
		(0.008)		(0.010)	8	12
Post Reform × College × share pop. with high-school degree (std.)		0.003		0.003	9	13
		(0.004)		(0.004)	10	14
Post Reform × High-school × share pop. with high-school degree (st		0.007		0.007	11	15
		(0.005)		(0.005)	12	16
Post Reform × Less than high school × share pop. with high-school		0.014**		0.014*	13	17
		(0.007)		(0.007)	14	18
Observations	137,718	137,718	137,718	137,718	19	19
R^2	0.346	0.347	0.000	0.001	20	20
Year Effects	✓	✓	✓	✓	21	21
Municipality Fixed Effects	✓	✓	✓	✓	22	22
Cohort × linear trends	✓	✓	✓	✓	23	23
Control mean	0.0350	0.0350	0.0350	0.0350	24	24

Notes: The dependent variable is $FemaleMayor_{i,t}$, an indicator equal to 1 if the mayor in office is a woman. The measure of local educational attainment is the share of the population holding at least a high-school degree, measured in the 1991 Population Census and standardized to have mean zero and standard deviation one. Columns (1) and (3) interact $PostReform_{i,t}$ with local educational attainment. Columns (2) and (4) allow this gradient to vary with the educational attainment of the mayor serving before the reform, following the three categories defined in Section 5. The three categories identify municipalities in which the pre-reform incumbent held at least a college degree, held a high-school degree as the highest educational attainment, or had not completed high-school. Columns (1) and (2) report OLS estimates, while columns (3) and (4) report 2SLS estimates. In the 2SLS specifications, $PostReform_{i,t}$ and all its interactions are instrumented using scheduled reform exposure and the corresponding interactions with the predetermined education measures. All specifications include municipality fixed effects, calendar-year fixed effects, and treatment-cohort-specific linear trends. Standard errors robust to clustering at the municipality level are reported in parentheses. *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent levels, respectively.

Table B.9: Impact of the reform on the characteristics of mayors

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
	Age Mayor	College Mayor	High school Mayor	No High sch. Mayor	High-skill job Mayor	Win next
Post Reform	0.520*	0.098***	–0.037**	–0.061***	0.056***	0.256***
	(0.309)	(0.014)	(0.015)	(0.009)	(0.011)	(0.018)
Observations	137,718	137,718	137,718	137,718	137,718	137,718
R^2	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.001	0.004
Year Effects	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Municipality Fixed Effects	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Cohort × linear trends	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Control mean	44.926	0.355	0.428	0.217	0.100	0.400

Notes: In column (1), the dependent variable is the age of the mayor. In column (2), the dependent variable is an indicator equal to 1 if the mayor holds a college degree. In column (3), the dependent variable is an indicator equal to 1 if the mayor holds a high-school degree as the highest educational attainment. In column (4), the dependent variable is an indicator equal to 1 if the mayor did not complete high-school. In column (5), the dependent variable is an indicator equal to 1 if the mayor worked in a high-skill profession before appointment. In column (6), the dependent variable is an indicator equal to 1 if the mayor is re-elected after the next election. Standard errors robust to clustering at the municipality level are in parentheses. *,**,*** represent the 10%, 5%, 1% significance levels.