

**UNIVERSITA' CATTOLICA DEL SACRO CUORE
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**Dottorato di ricerca in criminologia
ciclo XXX**

**S.S.D: SPS/12 - Sociologia giuridica, della devianza e mutamento
sociale; SPS/04 - Scienza politica; SECS-S/05 - Statistica sociale.**

**VIOLENT CULTURES AND LIMITED STATEHOOD: HOW
TRENDS IN WARFARE AND TERRORISM INFLUENCE
HOMICIDE TRENDS**

**Tesi di Dottorato di: Alexander Kamprad
Matricola: 4411787**

Anno Accademico 2016 / 2017



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Coordinatore: Ch.mo Prof. Francesco Calderoni

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Abstract

Based on the cross-national analyses of the effects of collective violence (warfare and terrorism) on homicide rates, my Ph.D. research contributes to the opening of criminological homicide studies towards an integrated perspective on violence. The main original finding is that both terrorism and various forms of warfare (e.g. ethnic, civil and international wars) are robustly and positively associated with homicide. These findings are based on the calculation of a series of fixed-effects models on a panel that incorporates more than 100 countries over more than 20 years since 1990. The results lend tentative support to the so-called 'legitimation of violence' and 'legitimation-habituation' hypotheses that have been formulated in regard to the cross-national effects of nation-wars on homicide rates, and to the effects of terror attacks and prolonged states of belligerence on homicide rates in Israel, respectively. Both hypotheses suggest that collective violence bears a positive causal effect on homicide, but the topic has been largely neglected in criminological research since the original formulation of the hypotheses more than 30 years ago. This study concludes that a causal influence of collective violence on homicide is likely, but cannot conclusively be proven within the confines of a cross-national research design. From a theoretical perspective, relevant criminological frameworks should be enriched with two distinct concepts from political science which allow to situate the hypotheses within a larger framework of 'culture of violence' and 'governance in areas of limited statehood'.

Riassunto

Sulla base delle analisi transnazionali degli effetti della violenza collettiva (guerra e terrorismo) sui tassi di omicidi, la mia ricerca di dottorato contribuisce all'apertura di studi criminologici sull'omicidio verso una prospettiva integrata sulla violenza. La principale scoperta originale è che sia il terrorismo che le varie forme di guerra (ad esempio guerre etniche, civili e internazionali) sono associate in modo forte e positivo all'omicidio. Queste conclusioni si basano sul calcolo di una serie di modelli ad effetti fissi su un panel che comprende più di 100 paesi in oltre 20 anni dal 1990. I risultati danno un sostegno provvisorio alle ipotesi di "legittimazione della violenza" e "legittimazione-abituazione" formulate per quanto riguarda gli effetti transnazionali delle guerre nazionali sui tassi di omicidi, e gli effetti degli attentati terroristici e dei prolungati stati di belligeranza sui tassi di omicidi in Israele, rispettivamente. Entrambe le ipotesi suggeriscono che la violenza collettiva abbia un effetto causale positivo sull'omicidio, ma il tema è stato ampiamente trascurato nella ricerca criminologica fin dalla formulazione originale delle ipotesi più di 30 anni fa. Questo studio conclude che l'influenza causale della violenza collettiva sull'omicidio è probabile, ma non può essere dimostrata in modo definitivo entro i confini di un disegno di ricerca transnazionale. Da un punto di vista teorico, i quadri criminologici rilevanti dovrebbero essere arricchiti da due concetti distinti della scienza politica che permettono di collocare le ipotesi in un quadro più ampio di "cultura della violenza" e di "governance in aree di limitata statualità".

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List of Acronyms

ANC	African National Congress
CSP	Center for Systemic Peace
ETA	Euskadi Ta Askatasuna
EU	European Union
FDN	Fuerza Democrática Nicaragüense
FMLN	Frente Farabundo Martí para la Liberación Nacional
FPR	Front patriotique rwandais
FRUD	Front for the Restoration of Unity and Democracy
FSLN	Frente Sandinista de Liberación Nacional
GAM	General Aggression Model
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
GTD	Global Terrorism Database
ICD	International Classification of Diseases
IFP	Inkatha Freedom Party
INSCR	Integrated Network for Societal Conflict Research
IR	International Relations
IRA	Irish Republican Army
MEPV	Major Episodes of Political Violence
MKO	Mujahedin-e Khalq Organization
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NPA	New People's Army
OC	Organized Crime
OECD	Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development
OLS	Ordinary Least Squares
OSCE	Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe
PRIO	Peace Research Institute Oslo
SE	Standard Error
START	National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism
UMD	University of Maryland
UN	United Nations
UN DESA	United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs
UNHCR	United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights
UNODC	United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime
WDI	World Development Indicators
WHO	World Health Organization

*"Oh dear, I never realized what a terrible lot
of explaining one has to do in a murder!"*
Agatha Christie, *Spider's Web* (by character Clarissa Hailsham-Brown) (1954)

Introduction

Nearly half a million people fell victim to homicide in 2012, accounting for a rate of 6.2 per 100.000.¹ As compared to industrialized parts of the world, many transitional and developing countries experience severely elevated rates. Homicide in those countries often relates to varying forms of collective violence. This marks an important difference from regions with comparatively low homicide rates. Latin America is the region most affected by homicide, followed by Africa. Central America and Southern Africa are the most affected sub-regions. National rates reach up to 90,4 (Honduras, highest in the world). Rates above 20 are thereby classified as "high" (UNODC 2013, 12).

Many countries look at staggering scenarios of violence and insecurity that are driven by a complex interplay of interpersonal violence, warfare, organized crime/terrorism and security interventions. In regard to rising homicide rates in Northern Africa, Southern Asia and Eastern Africa, for example, the global homicide study notes that they are most likely "a result of political violence which may in turn foster lethal violence related to criminal activities" (ibid., 13). In policy documents, but also in the scientific literature, such statements on links between different forms of violence are frequently made. However, little empirical knowledge is available as to whether this link does indeed exist, and if so, how strong it is.

A variety of countries give good examples of settings where crime and conflict are hard to distinguish. On a global scale, this is by no means an exceptional phenomenon. It poses a severe challenge, however, firstly to the people affected by violence and secondly to policy makers and researchers alike. International organizations increasingly point to the link between insecurity and socioeconomic development (ibid., 25). Widespread crime and criminal violence, as compared to traditional concepts of conflict, are thereby more and more recognized

¹ Unless declared otherwise, numbers here and hereafter are from UNODC's Global Study on Homicide 2013

as highly destabilizing factors. This regards the role of crime during conflict, crime as conflict and the significant harm crime produces without being labeled as conflict.²

From a researcher's point of view, several aspects of this are challenging. As a rather practical problem, widespread impunity and lack of professional policing have resulted in generally distorted official accounts and statistics, even more so during times of conflict. This complicates empirical research in the field. Equally challenging, however, is that the ambiguity of crime and conflict in transitional and developmental contexts bears a conceptual and disciplinary problem. Traditionally, criminology deals with the study of "normal" crime. For a long time, also international criminology has only been international in the sense that it compared "normal" crime between countries. This links to a discursive divide that is somewhat constitutive to criminology, namely between internal security on one side and external and national security on the other.³

From a Durkheimian perspective, crime is "normal" and as such poses no threat to the state (see Durkheim 2013, 97 ff.; also see Dentler and Erikson 1959; Borch 2014, 48).⁴ On the contrary, while crime needs to be managed, it may also be productive in contributing to processes that foster societal advancement. An enemy of the state, on the other hand, triggers the notion of a breakdown of public order (see Vittinghoff 1936).⁵ He makes for a conflict party that puts the very existence of the state in jeopardy. This is not "normal" but "exceptional" and comes with a distinct legal order: the state of exception (Cf. Huysmans 2008; Aradau and Munster 2009). Hence, the heavier the crime or the more external its roots, the more it becomes a matter of national security in discursive terms.

This certainly holds true for terrorism. It was not until the attacks of September 11th that criminology caught on widely to the subject. Prior to that, domestic terrorism was almost exclusively a matter of political science, and international terrorism a matter of international relations and security studies (See Rosenfeld 2004; Hamm 2007). This was even more so the

² The significant reduction of "all forms of violence and related death rates everywhere" has meanwhile made it to the UN's sustainable development goals (SDG 16) -- <https://www.un.org/sustainabledevelopment/peace-justice/>, accessed 23/11/2016

³ On the blurring of the divide see Bigo (2001)

⁴ While Durkheim emphasized the 'societal' normality of crime, Borch points to the "shift away from homo criminalis" related to the emergence of Rational Choice Criminology in the 1970s, esp. Gary Becker's work (G. S. Becker 1968). Also see Hulsman (1986) on the normality of crime.

⁵ Vittinghoff describes the historical origins of the 'enemy of the state' by example of *demnatio memoriae* in Ancient Rome – in German)

case for warfare which is a traditional domain of international relations. With the increasing development of an international criminal law since the 1990s, however, matters of warfare have also evolved as a criminological topic.

In any case, both terrorism and warfare are rather still at the sidelines of the criminological discourse. Organized crime, to the contrary, is a more traditional field of criminology. The criminological focus in studying organized crime, however, has rarely been on violence. For many years, organized crime was partly negated and partly considered as “normal”, especially in the form of white-collar crime and gangs.⁶ Where crime escalated to a degree as to threatening the state with wide-spread violence, it grew out of reach of mainstream criminology to turn into a subject for legal studies and sociology (Osorio 2012, 3).⁷ Correspondingly, when looking into the legal history of some jurisdictions (e.g. Germany and Austria), it becomes apparent that offenses relating to organized crime descend from crimes of association that were introduced in the 19th century. They did not criminalize criminal organizations in a narrow sense but secret associations that were considered threatening to the state for being “subversive”. Provisions on both, terrorism and organized crime, developed out of such crimes of association. Eventually, the “discovery” of organized crime as a transnational security threat, with the milestone of the adoption of the UN Convention on Transnational Organized Crime (2000), reinforced criminological interest on the subject. It also put organized crime on the agenda of IR/Security Studies which yielded somewhat contested concepts such as narcoterrorism and criminal insurgency—or more generally the crime-terror continuum (Makarenko 2004; Makarenko 2012).⁸

The confrontation of the aforementioned discursive divide between internal and external security on one hand, and the ambiguity of crime and conflict in transitional and developing contexts on the other, has thus produced loose ends. These are especially apparent when turning to the comparative analysis of levels and patterns of homicide in different world regions. While homicide rates are highest in Latin American and African countries, the criminological study of homicide has largely concentrated on Western countries in the past. Similarly, violence in developing countries has caught the interest of political and security scientists. In the tradition

⁶ This relates to the Chicago School of Criminology, esp. Sutherland (1940) on white collar crime and A. K. Cohen (1956) on gangs.

⁷ “Research on organized crime offers limited explanations to understanding large-scale organized crime violence as it considers overt criminal violence as an empirical anomaly”

⁸ Meanwhile the crime-terror continuum appears to have devolved into merely a “nexus”

of international relations, however, the focus is mostly on large-scale violence while everyday violence is typically disregarded. This has led to a scattered theoretical framework. As for the criminological study of homicide, it falls short in explaining homicide where it occurs the most. And as for collective violence, it disregards a significant portion of violence that may appear to be “general” but shows more intensity than many officially declared conflicts.

A key aspect in filling this conceptual gap may be to explore the aforementioned loose ends and to further contribute to the opening of criminological thought to transitional and developing contexts. This means to aim for an integrated theoretical framework that goes beyond traditional criminological research interests—an on-going process which relates to international political processes and has been termed “Blue Criminology” (Redo 2012).⁹ Besides a strong stream of neo-conservative thinking in international relations, it is noteworthy that such an approach necessarily addresses questions that—far under the radar of policy relevance—were previously covered by somewhat marginalized streams in criminology, i.e. critical, radical or post-colonial criminology. And linking back to Blue Criminology, it touches upon fundamental questions of development, (security) governance and the rule of law that are dealt with in political science.¹⁰

As for the study of homicide, a contribution can be made by trying to bridge the conceptual gap between homicide and conflict-related killings, or rather violence in interpersonal versus violence in collective settings. This research attempts to do so by examining the links between homicide trends and different forms of collective violence, i.e. warfare and terrorism. How have homicide, warfare and terrorism trends developed over the past decades? Are these trends linked, and if so: How strong is this link, and how can it be explained—Are warfare and terrorism criminogenic? Major attention in addressing these questions shall be given to the implications that findings may bear on the clustering of violence in certain developing countries and world regions. The aim is not to add further to the conceptual blurring of crime and conflict. To the contrary, the main added value that criminology may offer as an essentially interdisciplinary science is to incorporate perspectives on violence from various disciplines—and strive for new approaches to the study of criminal violence that better capture the

⁹ Redo coined the term in relation to the idea that over the past century the UN has [successfully] pushed for the world to counter crime globally

¹⁰ To be complete, also psychology and non-criminological sociology of violence shall be mentioned.

differences between the industrialized world and many areas in transitional and developing countries.

This dissertation attempts to do so by providing an empirical analysis of the effects that terrorism and warfare may have on homicide rates. First, the theoretical background and the research questions are outlined in chapters I and II. Chapter III presents the hypotheses and describes the methods applied in this study, namely econometric panel analysis. Data has been drawn from a variety of sources, including the Global Terrorism Database (counts of terror attacks and victims), the Center for Systemic Peace (warfare and major violence magnitude scores), as well as Clio Infra, the WHO, and UNODC (homicide rates). The results from the analyses are presented in chapter IV to VI. Each chapter deals with a specific aspect that is relevant to the dissertation. This includes the development of homicide rates over the past decades and the influence that socioeconomic variables have on homicide trends (Chapter IV); terrorism trends during the past decades, and the effect that terror attacks have on homicide rates (Chapter V); and an overview of warfare and major violence other than warfare during the past decades, and how warfare affects homicide trends (Chapter VI).

The main findings from the dissertation lend support to a positive link between terrorism, warfare, and homicide rates. These findings are discussed in light of their theoretical implications and their policy relevance in Chapter VII.