

BRIEF REPORT

Hybrid ideologies and glorification of violence during adolescence: Links to support for violent and nonviolent radicalization

Diana Miconi¹  | Michela Zambelli²  | Aoudou Njingou Mouchingam³ |
Cécile Rousseau⁴ 

¹Department of Educational Psychology and Adult Education, Université de Montréal, Montreal, Quebec, Canada

²Department of Psychology, Università Cattolica del Sacro Cuore, Milan, Italy

³Department of Sociology, Université de Québec à Montréal, Montréal, Quebec, Canada

⁴Division of Social and Cultural Psychiatry, McGill University, Montreal, Quebec, Canada

Correspondence

Diana Miconi, Department of Educational Psychology and Adult Education, University of Montréal, QC, Canada.

Email: diana.miconi@umontreal.ca

Funding information

Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council

Abstract

Adolescence is a seminal period for the development of ideologies and a time of heightened risk for both violent and nonviolent radicalization. Although mounting evidence points to the growing prevalence of hybrid ideologies and violence glorification among individuals legitimizing violence, empirical studies that document these emerging phenomena are scarce, especially among youth. If and how specific ideologies or their combination are associated with increased risks of psychological distress, violent and nonviolent radicalization, remains to be established. This study investigates ideological profiles of Canadian adolescents and their associations with support for violent and nonviolent radicalization and depressive symptoms. High school students ($N = 574$; $M_{\text{age}} = 16.1$; $SD_{\text{age}} = 0.76$; 47.7% girls) completed an online survey in 2024. A Latent Profile Analysis on support for multiple ideologies (i.e., nationalist, xenophobic, pro-environmental, masculinist, and pro-LGBTQ2S+ ideologies) and glorification of violence was conducted. Multinomial regression was used to explore the associations between profiles and study variables. Results identified four profiles (moderate nonviolent conservative, pro-violence masculinist, nonviolent progressive, and pro-violence conservative), which suggested complex combinations of conservative ideologies (xenophobia and masculinism) and glorification of violence. Girls, adolescents who reported higher nonviolent radicalization, and lower violent radicalization were more likely to belong to a nonviolent progressive profile. Lower activism distinguished pro-violence conservative profiles from nonviolent ones. Primary prevention efforts should address the glorification of violence among youth beyond specific ideologies and promote and allow nonviolent forms of activism and action to prevent violence.

KEY WORDS

activism, adolescence, ideologies, radicalization, violence

The increasing prevalence of ideological violence among youth (Rousseau et al., 2025) poses significant threats to social cohesion and perceptions of safety within both educational contexts and broader society, thereby positioning the prevention of youth violence as an urgent public health concern (Mayer et al., 2024). Ideologies have been traditionally associated with radicalization, a process in which individuals or groups progressively endorse actions—whether individual or collective—as a means of pursuing specific political, social, or religious objectives (Schmid, 2013). The

process of radicalization per se does not necessarily lead to violence, as it can also develop toward an involvement in democratic and nonviolent means of advocating or contributing to social change (Miconi et al., 2021). Contribution to society is indeed a pillar of youth education in democratic societies, and a key element for thriving that needs to be supported by educational institutions within a positive youth development perspective (Lerner et al., 2021). More recently, scholars working on youth radicalization have pointed to new forms of (non-ideological) nihilistic violence,

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associated with pervasive feelings of absurdity shattering the moral world and with the glorification of violence in itself, with no other aim than to contribute to spread more destruction and chaos (Rousseau et al., 2025). While radical ideas and actions have historically contributed to driving or resisting social and political change, in the present context it becomes essential to identify factors associated with legitimizing violence, whether in pursuit of an ideology or not (Miconi et al., 2021). The present paper investigates whether and how multiple ideologies and the non-ideological glorification of violence, that are now prevalent among youth, are associated with support for violent radicalization (VR) and/or nonviolent radicalization (NVR).

This issue is particularly salient during adolescence, a critical developmental stage for ideological formation (Steinberg, 2014) that also represents a heightened period of sensitivity to radicalization (Amit & Kafy, 2022). Of importance, the developmental dynamics of adolescence—such as the search for identity and belonging, coupled with a propensity for risk-taking—render youth, especially susceptible to extremist ideologies and violent pathways (Schröder et al., 2022).

Most research in the field of VR has focused on one ideology at the time, mostly on religious (Islam) or specific political (far-right) ideologies (Jahnke et al., 2022). Less is known about other common political (e.g., green) or gender-based (e.g., pro-LGBTQ2S+, masculinism) ideologies, which are increasingly common online and among youth (Frounfelker et al., 2023; O'Hanlon et al., 2024). In addition, recent studies have documented the emergence of hybrid ideologies (Norris, 2020; Rousseau et al., 2025), also referred to as “salad bar of ideologies” (Kupper & Meloy, 2021). These terms describe how people pick and choose multiple political and religious ideas across diverse ideologies to fit their own narratives, that sometimes can even contradict each other. These hybrid ideologies now represent the majority of referrals to clinical teams and security services (Government of the United Kingdom's Home Office, 2020; Rousseau et al., 2024). Although preliminary evidence suggests the pertinence of investigating this phenomenon with youth samples, empirical research is scant.

Another important concerning phenomenon among youth in the field of youth violence is the non-ideological glorification of violence within a nihilistic perspective, such as the attraction to and glorification of school shootings (Gartenstein-Ross et al., 2023; Miconi et al., 2024; Podoshen et al., 2015; Rousseau et al., 2025). While clinical observations suggest the need for prevention and intervention approaches distinct from those targeting ideological violence, the limited availability of empirical data prevents a systematic examination of the relationship between support for ideological and non-ideological violence. Understanding the prevalence, evolution, and combination of multiple ideologies and non-ideological glorification of violence is essential to tailor prevention initiatives.

Albeit limited, available evidence suggests that the process of (violent or nonviolent) radicalization unfolds

similarly across ideologies (Jahnke et al., 2022). However, available studies did not include the assessment of multiple ideologies nor the glorification of violence simultaneously and did not assess both VR and NVR. These limitations hinder the possibility to better understand these mounting phenomena among youth and to disentangle whether and how some ideologies or combinations of ideologies are associated with increased risks of VR.

Depressive symptoms have been increasing among youth (Lu et al., 2024) and have been identified in a recent meta-analysis as a potential risk factor for youth political violence (Jahnke et al., 2022). Yet, some evidence points to a possible protective role of support for violence and disengagement with social or political causes (but not of activism) on youth's mental health. Violence and disengagement could represent potential coping strategies to deal with lack of agency when facing injustice in society (Miconi et al., 2024). Such findings are supported by a recent population-based study that found that higher involvement in activism during adolescence was associated with an increase in depressive symptoms over time (Sciola et al., 2025). Given the high prevalence of depressive symptoms among youth, exploring their association with multiple ideologies and glorification of violence could provide precious insights on the relationships between ideologies, activism and violence during adolescence.

CURRENT STUDY

The present study aims to investigate in a sample of Canadian high school students: (1) prevalence of profiles of support for multiple ideologies and glorification of violence; (2) associations between profile belonging and support for VR and NVR; and (3) associations between profile belonging and depressive symptoms.

A priori hypotheses about profiles and the associated variables cannot be formulated given the exploratory nature of the study. Yet, we would expect profile(s) that score high in glorification of violence to report fewer depressive symptoms and to be at increased risk of supporting VR.

METHODS

Participants

A total of 574 adolescents ($M_{\text{age}} = 16.1$; $SD_{\text{age}} = 0.76$; 47.7% girls) were recruited across six ethnically diverse public high schools in Quebec, Canada (58.1% with an immigrant background), and responded to an online survey (see Table 1).

Procedure

Data were collected from January to April 2024. Participants were recruited by establishing partnerships with six public high schools in Quebec (Canada). Study participants

TABLE 1 Descriptive statistics and reliability of study variables (N=574).

| | Mean (SD) | Range | Missing N (%) | McDonald's omega |
|-------------------------------------|--------------|-------------|---------------|------------------|
| Nonviolent ARIS | 15.8 (6.88) | 4–28 | 37 (6.4%) | 0.89 |
| Violent ARIS | 11.2 (6.06) | 4–28 | 37 (6.4%) | 0.85 |
| Xenophobic ideologies 1 | 1.42 (0.86) | 1–5 | 23 (4.0%) | |
| Xenophobic ideologies 2 | 1.45 (0.92) | 1–5 | 21 (3.7%) | |
| Nationalism ideologies | 1.92 (1.12) | 1–5 | 33 (5.7%) | |
| Masculinism ideologies 1 | 1.68 (1.02) | 1–5 | 26 (4.5%) | |
| Masculinism ideologies 2 | 1.75 (1.05) | 1–5 | 44 (7.7%) | |
| Violence glorification ideologies 1 | 1.54 (0.998) | 1–5 | 27 (4.7%) | |
| Violence glorification ideologies 2 | 1.87 (1.25) | 1–5 | 31 (5.4%) | |
| Pro-LGBTQ+ ideologies 1 | 2.73 (1.56) | 1–5 | 64 (11.1%) | |
| Pro-LGBTQ+ ideologies 2 | 2.98 (1.47) | 1–5 | 74 (12.9%) | |
| Pro-environment ideologies 1 | 3.27 (1.42) | 1–5 | 64 (11.1%) | |
| Pro-environment ideologies 2 | 3.82 (1.24) | 1–5 | 48 (8.4%) | |
| Depressive symptoms | 19.1 (13.3) | 0–48 | 58 (10.1%) | 0.94 |
| Age | 16.1 (0.76) | 15–18 | 84 (14.6%) | |
| | | N (%) | | |
| Gender | | | | |
| Girl | | 274 (47.7%) | | |
| Boy | | 264 (46.0%) | | |
| Transgender or gender diverse | | 15 (2.6%) | | |
| Missing | | 21 (3.7%) | | |
| Immigrant generation | | | | |
| ≥ Third generation | | 210 (36.6%) | | |
| First or second generation | | 333 (58.1%) | | |
| Missing | | 31 (5.4%) | | |

completed an online questionnaire on youth's adaptation to the current polarized social context in either French or English during school hours in the presence of the teacher and a research assistant. Research assistants explained that the questionnaire explored a range of beliefs and values present in society with which some people may agree while others disagree. Students were informed that there were no right or wrong answers and that the research team was interested in their personal perspectives and experiences. All participants were informed that their involvement was voluntary and confidential and provided an electronic informed consent. All students enrolled in regular secondary 4 or 5 classes (grades 10 and 11) and aged between 14 and 18 were eligible to participate in the study. Response rate was 84.57%. The research ethics board of each school board gave approval prior to data collection. Study protocol and procedures were approved by the Committee on Ethics in Educational and Psychological Research at the University of Montreal (#CEREP-22-123-D).

Measures

Descriptive statistics and reliability of study variables are presented in [Table 1](#).

ARIS

The Activism and Radicalism Intention Scale (ARIS) (Moskalenko & McCauley, 2009) includes items that assess an individual's readiness to participate in legal (Nonviolent ARIS, 4 items) and illegal violent behaviors (Violent ARIS, 4 items) in the name of one's group or organization. Respondents rated their agreement with each statement on a seven-point Likert scale, with higher sum scores indicating more support for VR and NVR.

Ideologies

Support for multiple ideologies was assessed by selecting ad-hoc items formulated by adapting some existing scales for youth (Hickman et al., 2021; Sabbagh, 2005; Van Oosten et al., 2015; Woodford et al., 2012) and based on the teams' field and clinical observations in schools. Items were pilot-tested with a group of young people. Participants were asked to express their level of agreement with a series of statements, on a Likert scale from 1 "Strongly disagree" to 5 "Strongly agree." Specifically, we measured support for five ideologies and glorification of

violence: (1) Nationalist ideologies; (2) Xenophobic ideologies; (3) Pro-environmental ideologies; (4) Masculinist ideologies; (5) Pro-LGBTQ+ ideologies; and (6) Glorification of violence. Higher mean scores indicated higher support for the specific construct considered. Items can be found in the Supplemental Material.

Depressive symptoms

The Center for Epidemiologic Studies Depression Scale (CES-D) (Radloff, 1977) was administered, which includes 16 items that assess multiple symptoms of depression. Respondents indicated on a scale ranging from 0 (Not at all) to 3 (Very often) how often they experienced each symptom, with higher sum scores indicating more frequent depressive symptoms.

Socio-demographic variables

Participants provided information on their age, gender, and immigrant background (first-, second-, and third generation or more). Socio-demographic variables were selected based on prior findings indicating they represent potential confounders in the associations between multiple predictors and our outcomes (Jahnke et al., 2022). In particular, gender differences were found with girls at lower risk of VR (Duindam et al., 2025) and reporting higher depressive scores than boys (Salk et al., 2016). These differences may be linked to the specific socialization of girls toward more internalizing than externalizing ways of expressing distress, as well as to differences in social-cognitive development and self-control skills across genders. Girls also tend to be more likely to situate themselves on the political left, which focuses more on advancing gender equality (Nennstiel & Hudde, 2025).

Data analysis plan

Preliminary analysis

Participants responses were checked for validity and consistency based on time of completion (i.e., participants who completed the questionnaire in less than 10 min were excluded), patterns of responses (e.g., all “1” responses, patterns of responses “1-2-3-4” etc.) and amount of missing data (e.g., more than 50% of missing data). The nonparametric test of Jamshidian and Jalal (2010) indicated no evidence against a Missing Completely at Random (MCAR) mechanism for missing data ($p = .647$). Missing data were handled in *Mplus* via the full information maximum likelihood (FIML) method. All analyses were performed using *R* software and *Mplus* software (version 8.8).

Latent profile analysis

A Latent Profile Analysis was performed in *Mplus* to identify latent profiles of support for multiple ideologies and nihilistic violence (11 items). The most recent guidelines and methodological practices were followed to identify the best LPA solution and evaluate the quality of classification (Ferguson et al., 2020; Sorgente et al., 2025). The appropriate number of latent profiles was selected based on a comprehensive evaluation of model fit indices (i.e., AIC, CAIC, BIC, adj-BIC, and AWE; where lower values indicate a better model fit), profiles distribution (at least 5% of cases included in the smallest profile), parsimony, and interpretability. Once the best LPA solution was identified, the accuracy of classification was examined by consulting the level of Entropy ($>.70$ indicating a good quality of classification) and Classification Diagnostics, among which the modal class assignment proportion (mcaP), that is expected to be included in the 95% confidence interval of the corresponding profile proportion ($CP \circ \pi$); the average posterior probability (avePP) that should be $>.70$ for each profile; and the odds of correct classification (OCC) which should be >5 for each profile.

Associations between covariates and latent profile membership (based on the best profile solution) were examined testing multinomial logistic regressions for categorical latent variable implemented in the three-step procedure (R3STEP) in *Mplus*. This method allows for the inclusion of predictors of latent profile membership while accounting for classification error. In favor of parsimony and given the exploratory nature of our study, we decided to adopt a sequential model-building approach. In Model 1, socio-demographic variables were included as covariates of profile membership: age (numerical), gender (boy vs. girl), and immigrant status (first/s generation vs. third generation). Subsequently, only statistically significant socio-demographic variables were maintained in the model, adding the other relevant predictors, that is, VR and NVR (ARIS; Model 2) and depressive symptoms (Model 3).

RESULTS

The four-profile model solution was selected as the best model according to model fit, distribution and interpretability of profiles. The solution showed an optimal entropy (0.89), and classification diagnostics confirmed the precision and stability of classification of individuals in different profiles (see Tables 2 and 3). Figure 1 presents the standardized scores of the 11 items included in the LPA. The “Moderate nonviolent conservative” profile ($N=233$; 41%) showed average scores of xenophobia, nationalism, masculinism and glorification of violence and below-average scores on pro-LGBTQ+ and pro-environment ideologies. The “Pro-violence masculinist” profile ($N=29$; 5%) showed above-average scores of glorification of violence and of masculinism, average scores of

TABLE 2 Fit statistics of latent profile analysis of hybrid ideologies and nihilistic glorification of violence.

| k-profile | LL | Df | AIC | CAIC | BIC | adj-BIC | AWE | Entropy | Profiles distributions |
|-----------|----------|----|----------|----------|----------|----------|----------|---------|--------------------------|
| 2 | -7809.92 | 34 | 15687.84 | 15747.43 | 15835.35 | 15835.35 | 15909.03 | 0.930 | 484, 82 |
| 3 | -7448.97 | 46 | 14989.94 | 15070.57 | 15189.51 | 15043.48 | 15289.20 | 0.876 | 292, 226, 48 |
| 4 | -7279.97 | 58 | 14675.94 | 14777.60 | 14927.57 | 14743.45 | 15053.27 | 0.888 | 270, 233, 34, 29 |
| 5 | -7118.92 | 70 | 14377.84 | 14500.53 | 14681.54 | 14459.32 | 14833.23 | 0.888 | 252, 172, 88, 33, 21 |
| 6 | -7047.28 | 82 | 14258.56 | 14402.29 | 14614.33 | 14354.01 | 14792.03 | 0.863 | 191, 173, 87, 87, 64, 21 |

Abbreviations: adj-BIC, adjusted Bayesian information criterion; AIC, Akaike information criterion; AWE, Approximate Weight of Evidence Criterion. BIC, Bayesian information criterion; CAIC, consistent Akaike information criterion; df, degrees of freedom; LL, model log likelihood.

TABLE 3 Classification diagnostics for the four-class models.

| k-profile | N (%) | CP o π | 95% CI | mcaP | avePP | OCC |
|-----------|-----------|--------|-----------|------|-------|--------|
| 1 | 233 (41%) | .41 | (.36-.48) | .41 | .92 | 17.28 |
| 2 | 29 (5%) | .05 | (.03-.07) | .05 | .94 | 296.09 |
| 3 | 270 (48%) | .47 | (.41-.54) | .48 | .93 | 15.77 |
| 4 | 34 (6%) | .06 | (.04-.09) | .06 | .98 | 615.25 |

Abbreviations: 95% CI, confidence interval of CP; avePP, average posterior probability; CP o π, corresponding class proportion; mcaP, modal class assignment proportion; OCC, odds of correct classification.




FIGURE 1 Profiles of ideologies and glorification of violence with standardized mean values of the 11 indicators.

xenophobic and nationalistic ideologies, and below-average scores on pro-LGBTQ+ and pro-environment ideologies. The “Nonviolent progressive” profile ($N=270$; 48%) was characterized by above-average scores on pro-LGBTQ+ and pro-environment ideologies and low to average scores on all other indicators. Last, the “Pro-violence conservative” profile ($N=34$; 6%) presented above-average scores in

support for xenophobic ideologies, nationalism, masculinism and glorification of violence and the lowest scores on pro-LGBTQ+ and pro-environment ideologies.

Significant results from the multinomial logistic regressions for the final model are reported in Table 4. Results of all models can be found in the supplemental material (Tables S1–S3). Higher levels of NVR, lower levels

TABLE 4 Results of the final multinomial logistic regression model.

| Reference class | Covariate | Estimate (S.E.) | <i>p</i> -value | OR | CI 95% | OR's probability |
|--------------------------------------|------------------------------|-----------------|-----------------|------|-----------|------------------|
| P1: Pro-violence conservative | Nonviolent ARIS | | | | | |
| | P4: Nonviolent progressive | .15 (.04) | .000 | 1.16 | 1.07–1.26 | 54% |
| | Violent ARIS | | | | | |
| | P4: Nonviolent progressive | -.11 (.04) | .011 | .89 | .81–.97 | -52% |
| P2: Moderate nonviolent conservative | Gender | | | | | |
| | P4: Nonviolent progressive | -1.53 (.45) | .001 | .21 | .08–.52 | -83% |
| | Nonviolent ARIS | | | | | |
| | P3: Pro-violence masculinist | -.14 (.05) | .010 | .86 | .77–.96 | -52% |
| | P4: Nonviolent progressive | .124 (.02) | .000 | 1.13 | 1.07–1.18 | 53% |
| | Violent ARIS | | | | | |
| | P4: Nonviolent progressive | -.07 (.02) | .007 | .92 | .87–.97 | -52% |
| | Gender | | | | | |
| P3: Pro-violence masculinist | P4: Nonviolent progressive | -.84 (.27) | .002 | .42 | .24–.73 | -70% |
| | Depressive symptoms | | | | | |
| | P4: Nonviolent progressive | .03 (.01) | .002 | 1.03 | 1.01–1.05 | 51% |
| | Nonviolent ARIS | | | | | |
| | P4: Nonviolent progressive | .26 (.05) | .000 | 1.31 | 1.16–1.47 | 57% |
| | Violent ARIS | | | | | |
| | P4: Nonviolent progressive | -.16 (.05) | .003 | .85 | .76–.94 | -54% |
| | Gender | | | | | |
| | P4: Nonviolent progressive | -2.93 (1.16) | .012 | .05 | .005–.51 | -95% |

Note: S.E., standard error of the coefficient; OR, odds ratio; *p*-value, coefficient's *p*-value. The OR's probability indicates the increase (+) or the decrease (-) of the likelihood of membership into each profile relative to the reference group for one-unit increase in the predictor; reference group for gender is girls.

of VR, and being a girl increased between 52% and 95% the probability of being in the “Nonviolent progressive” profile compared with all others. Higher NVR was also associated with a decreased probability of 53% of being in the “Pro-violence masculinist” profile compared with the “Moderate nonviolent conservative” profile. Finally, higher levels of depression increased the probability of being in the “Nonviolent progressive profile” compared with the “Moderate nonviolent conservative” profile by 51%.

DISCUSSION

The four identified profiles indicate a diversity of ideological positioning during adolescence around some sensitive topics (LGBTQ+ rights, pro-environment, masculinism, xenophobia, and nationalism), associated sometimes with glorification of violence. The two largest profiles (i.e., the “moderate nonviolent conservative” and the “nonviolent progressive” ones), accounting for 89% of the sample, suggest that most adolescents hold moderate views that can be more conservative or progressive around social change and rights, without glorifying violence. The “pro-violence conservative” profile points toward adolescents that hold conservative ideologies matched with glorification of

violence, showing a consistent right-wing political positioning across the considered ideologies. The “pro-violence masculinist” profile stands out compared with all others because of their strong glorification of violence, paired with masculinist views but not with other conservative ideologies. Although we did not have a specific measure of support for nihilistic violence, this group of adolescents might capture this emerging non-ideological culture of violence among youth, which is presently becoming a major public health and security concern (Argentino et al., 2024; Rousseau et al., 2025). Our results suggest that youth who glorify violence without any clear social or political aim may still adhere to some cultural constructs that promote and value violence in itself (e.g., violence as a valued masculinist trait), but without a clear social or political explanatory framework or collective intent. Longitudinal research is still needed to establish the directionality of the association between glorification of violence and masculinism and to disentangle traditional notions of masculinity from more dystopian representations.

All groups but the “pro-violence conservatives” did not differ in terms of nationalism, which is historically valued in Quebec and which belongs to both left- and right-wing parties (Laniel, 2022). In addition, conservative profiles did not differ with regards to pro-environmental attitudes. Given the prevalence of eco-anxiety and

pro-environmental movements among youth, it is essential to address environmental concerns with young people and to support them in finding nonviolent democratic ways to voice their opinions and worries as well as to mobilize them into nonviolent action. Taken together, these results suggest that, within the Quebec context, both nationalism and pro-environment ideologies can be less polarizing and more empowering sensitive topics that can be addressed with youth in educational contexts and leveraged to get to a shared sense of belonging and common purpose. Noteworthy, divisive or empowering themes may vary across contexts and this should be carefully considered in the development of violence prevention programs.

The higher levels of depression and of support for NVR found in the progressive profile confirm prior findings linking activism with a worsening of mental health over time and can be interpreted in the present historical context in light of the ongoing crisis of our democratic societies (Sciola et al., 2025). Such results suggest that, despite the recent very polarizing political and public discourses around gender identities and sex education in Quebec, progressive ideologies among youth are more associated with nonviolent forms of contributing to social transformation than with VR.

Noteworthy, conservative profiles did not differ in terms of support for VR, but rather in levels of glorification of violence and activism. This confirms the importance of addressing this emerging culture of violence in youth, which does not completely overlap with traditional definitions of support for VR (DeGue et al., 2025). Among the three conservative profiles, the nonviolent moderate one stands out not for lower risk of VR, but rather for a higher probability of supporting NVR (with the lowest levels of glorification of violence). This finding suggests that a key focus of effective violence prevention with youth in the present context should be around nonviolent means of activism and contribution to society, rather than on direct or indirect condemnation of specific ideologies or VR. Although the spread of xenophobic and masculinist ideologies among youth is concerning and important to monitor and address, our findings suggest that these beliefs are endorsed by a minority of youth and are not specifically associated with support for VR. Despite the discomfort that such beliefs may generate in many adults in the North American societies, opening a non-moralizing dialogue where youth can explore their beliefs, feel heard and regain some agency in their life in nonviolent ways may be the best way out of a culture of violence. Addressing the normalization of violence and the dismissal of nonviolent activist engagement beyond specific ideological profiles may be critical leverage points for primary prevention strategies targeting youth. Yet, a social justice approach is also crucial considering prior findings showing how activism is less easily endorsed by youth who experience more social grievances and fewer privileges in their contexts of life (family, school, and community) (Miconi et al., 2024). Of importance, our results confirmed the presence of gender differences in ideologies and support for violence, with girls more likely to be in the nonviolent progressive profile than boys. Prevention

efforts should adopt gender-sensitive approaches tailored to the specific needs of both groups.

This study comes with some limitations. First, our cross-sectional data do not allow us to make causal inferences. Longitudinal studies are needed to shed light on trajectories of profiles among adolescents as well as on the directionality of associations. Second, data were collected in Quebec, and given the highly contextual and socio-political understandings of ideologies, radicalization and violence, results cannot be easily generalized to other provinces or countries. Last, validated short measures of multiple ideological beliefs and glorification of violence among youth are lacking, forcing us to use ad hoc items that focus only on some of the possible ideologies that circulate among youth. Future studies should aim to replicate our findings with validated scales able to more thoroughly measure ideological, nihilistic beliefs, and glorification of violence among youth. Notwithstanding these limitations, our results suggest that primary prevention initiatives should focus on countering the normalization and celebration of violence among youth across ideological lines, while encouraging and legitimizing nonviolent avenues for activism and social engagement as a means of reducing violent outcomes.

AUTHOR CONTRIBUTIONS

Diana Miconi: Conceptualization; funding acquisition; writing – original draft; methodology; validation; writing – review and editing; supervision; resources. **Aoudou Njingouo Mouchingam:** Writing – review and editing; formal analysis; visualization; data curation. **Michela Zambelli:** Writing – original draft; methodology; writing – review and editing; formal analysis; supervision; validation; software. **Cécile Rousseau:** Writing – review and editing; writing – original draft; validation.

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

We would like to thank all the schools that participated in our research as well as all participants for their time and contribution.

FUNDING INFORMATION

Our work is funded by the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council (SSHRC).

CONFLICT OF INTEREST STATEMENT

The authors declared no potential conflicts of interest with respect to the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.

DATA AVAILABILITY STATEMENT

The data that support the findings of this study are available from the corresponding author upon reasonable request.

ETHICS STATEMENT

All procedures performed in this study involving human participants were in accordance with the ethical standards of the 1964 Helsinki Declaration and its later amendments

or comparable ethical standards. The study was approved by the involved school boards and by the Committee on Ethics in Educational and Psychological Research at the University of Montréal (#CEREP-22-123-D).

CONSENT STATEMENT

Informed consent was obtained from all individual participants included in the study.

ORCID

Diana Miconi  <https://orcid.org/0000-0002-7088-1646>

Michela Zambelli  <https://orcid.org/0000-0002-0777-6245>

Cécile Rousseau  <https://orcid.org/0000-0002-6533-6774>

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SUPPORTING INFORMATION

Additional supporting information can be found online in the Supporting Information section at the end of this article.

How to cite this article: Miconi, D., Zambelli, M., Mounchingam, A. N., & Rousseau, C. (2026). Hybrid ideologies and glorification of violence during adolescence: Links to support for violent and nonviolent radicalization. *Journal of Research on Adolescence, 36*, e70203. <https://doi.org/10.1111/jora.70203>