Le tinte forti del dissenso nel tempo dell’ipercomunicazione pulviscolare. Quale compito per il diritto penale?

Any discussion on the "criminalization of dissenting opinions" is expected to lead to a general rebuttal. Dealing with this issue makes more sense if one considers the contemporary communicative non-space where violent and, above all, surprising utterances, even racist or simply negationist, seem to offer an easy redemption from the uniformity of virtual worlds, namely a phoney recovery of a lost "physicality" as individuals. In front of public expressions that undermine essential ethical and political foundations of society and upon which the media world easily bestows "moral salience” just for their sheer "strong shades", new interests, as worthy of criminal law protection, should be chosen. Also drawing from an interesting ECHR case law, a balance should be devised between the situations where the value of dignity is realized: in proportion to the limits freedom of expression meets as a component of human dignity, respect for the feelings of people belonging to communities which have suffered genocides seems worth of a criminal protection.