I study the relationship between debt maturity and agency conflicts between controlling and minority shareholders in unlisted firms. Exploiting cross-province variance in the development of local credit markets, I find that the monitoring effect of short-term bank debt is more effective in firms with less concentrated ownership structures.
Murtinu, S., Debt Maturity, Ownership Concentration, and Firm Efficiency, <<ECONOMICS BULLETIN>>, 2015; 35 (4): 2610-2616 [http://hdl.handle.net/10807/79243]
Debt Maturity, Ownership Concentration, and Firm Efficiency
Murtinu, Samuele
2015
Abstract
I study the relationship between debt maturity and agency conflicts between controlling and minority shareholders in unlisted firms. Exploiting cross-province variance in the development of local credit markets, I find that the monitoring effect of short-term bank debt is more effective in firms with less concentrated ownership structures.
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