The essay discusses, through a comparison with D.O. Brink, the model of the analytical realist ethics. At the center of debate are the nature of moral truth, the is-ought problem, the doctrine of the supervenience. Ethical realism seems to be lacking of an adequate idea of practical reason. The classic ethical "naturalism", suitably explained, offers a model of non-objectivist realism that can give answers to intuitionistic as well as to constructivist realism.
Botturi, F., Realismo morale, <<HERMENEUTICA>>, 2014; 2014 (N/A): 47-72 [http://hdl.handle.net/10807/70545]
Realismo morale
Botturi
2014
Abstract
The essay discusses, through a comparison with D.O. Brink, the model of the analytical realist ethics. At the center of debate are the nature of moral truth, the is-ought problem, the doctrine of the supervenience. Ethical realism seems to be lacking of an adequate idea of practical reason. The classic ethical "naturalism", suitably explained, offers a model of non-objectivist realism that can give answers to intuitionistic as well as to constructivist realism.
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