In a duopoly where both firms produce substitutes, we show that under process innovation, specialization is the equilibrium attained with cross-licensing. Each firm produces only the good for which it has an advantage, and social welfare may improve. Patent pool extension confirms the results.
Filippini, L., Cournot Competition in a Multiproduct Duopoly: Specialization through Licensing, <<INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF BUSINESS AND ECONOMICS>>, 2006; 5 (n. 3): 201-210 [http://hdl.handle.net/10807/1536]
Cournot Competition in a Multiproduct Duopoly: Specialization through Licensing
Filippini, Luigi
2007
Abstract
In a duopoly where both firms produce substitutes, we show that under process innovation, specialization is the equilibrium attained with cross-licensing. Each firm produces only the good for which it has an advantage, and social welfare may improve. Patent pool extension confirms the results.
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