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  <title>IRIS Macrotipologia:</title>
  <link rel="alternate" href="https://hdl.handle.net/10807/101" />
  <subtitle />
  <id>https://hdl.handle.net/10807/101</id>
  <updated>2026-10-01T10:05:09Z</updated>
  <dc:date>2026-10-01T10:05:09Z</dc:date>
  <entry>
    <title>Italian Audiovisual DEI Policies</title>
    <link rel="alternate" href="https://hdl.handle.net/10807/347712" />
    <author>
      <name />
    </author>
    <id>https://hdl.handle.net/10807/347712</id>
    <updated>2026-09-29T00:34:16Z</updated>
    <published>2026-01-01T00:00:00Z</published>
    <summary type="text">Titolo: Italian Audiovisual DEI Policies
Autori: Chiara Giaculli; Valerio Moccia; Mariagrazia Fanchi
Abstract: The database, developed as part of the research project “E|Quality. Strategies for Meaningful Inclusion in Italian Cinema and Television”, compiles information on the Diversity, Equity and Inclusion (DEI) policies and initiatives adopted by 95 Italian audiovisual production companies. The sample was selected from production companies active between 2017 and 2024 that had the greatest social impact through the content they produced, calculated by weighting each film produced by the number of cinema-goers and the production company’s shareholding. The original documents and policies can be retrieved in full from the project's dedicated archive, available at https://centric.unicatt.it/archiviodei.</summary>
    <dc:date>2026-01-01T00:00:00Z</dc:date>
  </entry>
  <entry>
    <title>The Feudal Origins of Economic Prosperity: Evidence from Medieval Sicily</title>
    <link rel="alternate" href="https://hdl.handle.net/10807/347436" />
    <author>
      <name />
    </author>
    <id>https://hdl.handle.net/10807/347436</id>
    <updated>2026-09-25T00:20:45Z</updated>
    <published>2026-01-01T00:00:00Z</published>
    <summary type="text">Titolo: The Feudal Origins of Economic Prosperity: Evidence from Medieval Sicily
Autori: Cherici, Leonardo; Merzoni, Guido; Rossignoli, Domenico; Trombetta, Federico
Abstract: This paper investigates the short- and long-run determinants of economic prosperity, tracing its origin to the feudal organization of the Middle Ages. Using newly coded data recording different feudal arrangements in the 13th and 14th century Sicily, and a repeated-cross section event-study design, we show that municipalities subject to stable feudal control by local lords exhibit worse economic outcomes than those that were repossessed and administered directly by the Crown for a period of time. This relationship is statistically significant for measures of economic prosperity in the medieval period — such as population and municipal rents — and for contemporary economic outcomes. We interpret these findings through the lens of a principal–agent framework, in which the interaction between the Crown and feudal lords is characterized by information asymmetries. Repossession by the Crown temporarily mitigates these informational frictions, limiting rent extraction and creating scope for the provision of public goods, with persistent effects on local development.</summary>
    <dc:date>2026-01-01T00:00:00Z</dc:date>
  </entry>
  <entry>
    <title>AI Worker Management technologies in traditional industries</title>
    <link rel="alternate" href="https://hdl.handle.net/10807/347397" />
    <author>
      <name />
    </author>
    <id>https://hdl.handle.net/10807/347397</id>
    <updated>2026-09-25T00:22:43Z</updated>
    <published>2026-01-01T00:00:00Z</published>
    <summary type="text">Titolo: AI Worker Management technologies in traditional industries
Autori: Collodoro, C.; Fanti, L.; Staccioli, J.; Virgillito, M. E.</summary>
    <dc:date>2026-01-01T00:00:00Z</dc:date>
  </entry>
  <entry>
    <title>Countering the diffusion of responsibility in petty collusive bribery: Experimental evidence on accountability reminders</title>
    <link rel="alternate" href="https://hdl.handle.net/10807/347325" />
    <author>
      <name />
    </author>
    <id>https://hdl.handle.net/10807/347325</id>
    <updated>2026-09-24T00:31:17Z</updated>
    <published>2026-01-01T00:00:00Z</published>
    <summary type="text">Titolo: Countering the diffusion of responsibility in petty collusive bribery: Experimental evidence on accountability reminders
Autori: M. Vittoria Levati; Chiara Nardi
Abstract: Petty collusive bribery is hard to curb because both the briber and the bribed official benefit from the transaction, while the harm falls on a third party. In a laboratory experiment, we show that a simple accountability reminder-stating that both actors are equally responsible for the corrupt exchange and its consequences---substantially reduces collusive bribery, lowering the frequency of both bribe offers and bribe acceptances. Giving the harmed third party the opportunity to express approval or disapproval of the actors' decisions, however, does not yield a further statistically significant reduction in corruption when combined with the accountability reminder. The results suggest that a low-cost intervention designed to counteract the diffusion of responsibility inherent in jointly produced corrupt outcomes can discourage corrupt behavior on both sides of the exchange and that combining behavioral interventions need not amplify their effects.</summary>
    <dc:date>2026-01-01T00:00:00Z</dc:date>
  </entry>
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